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Abstract 
This paper aims to contribute to that ever-expanding branch of the economic literature 
focused on the study of systemic banking crises and the development of statistical tools able 
to detect the signals of their occurrence in advance (Early Warning Systems). In particular, 
the three-step analysis, which constitutes the empirical core of the work, wants to provide 
robust evidences of the detrimental influence exerted by the post-crisis bias on the predictive 
efficacy of the binomial logistic model and whether this phenomenon magnifies along with 
the duration of the crisis episodes under scrutiny. Lastly, the average crisis duration, on a 
country basis, is linearly regressed on several economic, political and institutional metrics to 
further investigate which features usually distinguish those countries more prone to long-
lasting defaults. Results show that models which do not account for any specific post-crisis 
solution systematically underperform the ones adopting it, across different sample 
compositions and crisis definitions. The post-crisis bias strikes harder as longer-lasting events 
are considered in the tests, suggesting that the bias-related distortion inflates for those 
countries which, at least historically, are more exposed to durable defaults. As emerged by the 
ultimate linear regressions, this peculiarity is associated to wealthier economies (in terms of 
GDP per capita), more distributed and open financial sectors. 
   
 Table of Contents 
 
 
I. Introduction ...........................................................................................................................6 
II. Literature Review ..............................................................................................................12 
2.1 An historical overview on systemic banking crises and their determinants  ...................12 
2.1.1 Macroeconomic forces..............................................................................................13 
2.1.2 Microeconomic factors .............................................................................................16 
2.1.3 Institutional quality and regional studies ..................................................................19 
2.1.4 Findings and beliefs over crisis duration ..................................................................23 
2.2 The statistical models ......................................................................................................24 
2.2.1 The signal extraction approach .................................................................................24 
2.2.2 Binomial logit approach ...........................................................................................26 
2.2.3 Multinomial logit approach ......................................................................................29 
III. Setting the Empirical Stage .............................................................................................34 
3.1 A definition for “systemic banking crisis” ......................................................................34 
3.2 Explanatory variables ......................................................................................................35 
3.3 The data sample...............................................................................................................38 
3.4 The exercise step by step.................................................................................................39 
IV. Results................................................................................................................................42 
4.1 A multivariate binomial benchmark................................................................................42 
4.2 Graphing the Duration Effect ..........................................................................................50 
4.3 The hidden forces behind crisis duration ........................................................................53 
V. Robustness and Sensitivity Analysis.................................................................................60 
5.1 Determinants check-up....................................................................................................60 
5.2 A different definition for banking crisis..........................................................................62 
5.3 Multinomial logit model..................................................................................................67 
VI. Conclusions  .......................................................................................................................72 
Appendix ..................................................................................................................................76 
References ................................................................................................................................82 
  
 5 
 
  
 6 
 
Chapter I: 
Introduction 
The effort exerted by the economic research community in studying the determinants of 
systemic banking crises and their employment to forecast these peculiar phenomena has a 
relative recent history. The first major event that triggered interest over this topic was 
undoubtedly the Great Depression of the late ‘20s, that burst in New York but spread by 
contagion through several countries all over the world. The huge real economic costs 
characterizing this episode, as well as others distinguished by a banking sector collapse, are 
difficult to be computed with precision but were enough deep to highlight the pressing need 
of understanding the nature of these phenomena and the signals that could detect their 
occurrence in advance. Since then, several papers have been produced in the attempt of 
identifying the causes and the best model able to describe and predict the oncoming of a 
systemic crisis, in other words an Early Warning System (EWS). At the light of the massive 
detrimental effect that a banking meltdown has on the level of a country’s economic well-
being, the contribution that a similar tool could give to the policy making process is 
unquestionable and priceless. However, despite the remarkable work produced so far, recently 
boosted by the latest waves of crises started in the early ‘80s, the existing literature has not 
been able to deliver a sufficiently extended set of standard indications regarding which 
framework and variables would consistently fit with most of the systemic episodes 
experienced so far by worldwide countries. This mismatch is due to either structural 
differences among the empirical exercises, regarding executive choices taken by the authors, 
or the distinctive and evolving nature of systemic banking defaults all over history. First of 
all, it still does not exist a universally agreed definition of “systemic banking crisis”. This lack 
forced researchers to choose among few alternative solutions proposed by the creators of the 
main crisis dating databases which inevitably shaped the models and their results under a 
subjective perspective. Moreover, several different statistical models have been employed as 
EWS but, although just a handful of them have been used in the vast majority of the works, no 
one graduated as universally accepted standard due to their individual drawbacks. Other 
limitations, and so possible room for improvements, come from the selection of the indicators 
to be collected and included in the model to significantly predict the outburst of a crisis. 
During the last decades, tens of them have been evaluated, ranging from macroeconomic, 
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through microeconomic and banking sector related ones, to variables reflecting the wealth of 
the real economy and the robustness of the institutional structure of a country. In spite of the 
effort, just few of them have demonstrated to be strongly relevant in most of the papers, while 
many are not even available for a large number of countries, often forcing researchers to test 
their models on a restricted number of observations. Scenario that makes it even harder to 
conduct a robust analysis on events such as system banking crises which are notoriously rare 
even over large timespans. Finally, discrepancies among the characteristics of the data sets, 
mainly due to the strongly different economic environment distinguishing some regional 
clusters of countries, or even country-specific ones, led to conflicting results and the 
increasingly solid feeling that a universally accepted EWS is still far from being achieved. 
For what may concern the predictive models built so far, two frameworks have been leading 
the empirical scene on banking crises, especially during these last two fruitful decades. The 
first is the signal approach, a systematic statistical model, introduced by Kaminsky and 
Reinhart (1999) in their pioneering paper on the twin crises (i.e. the concomitant occurrence 
of banking and currency crises). The proposed method allowed for verifying the predictive 
capacity of some of the most discussed indicators of banking crises by individually testing 
them against a threshold value. Whether the variable had exceeded this safety level, then a 
warning signal would have been triggered. If the warning demonstrated to be able to predict 
the oncoming of a crisis within a horizon of 24 months, it would be considered a true signal. 
The approach accuracy have been progressively improved by setting the threshold value in 
order to minimize the so called noise-to-signal ratio that is the ratio between false signals and 
true ones. Nonetheless, since its first application, this counterintuitive approach presented 
some major drawbacks. It did not permit to measure the marginal predictive contribution of 
the single variable, as there was no room for distinction among different levels of abnormality 
in its behavior. Moreover, it did not count for the aggregated effect of the indicators, being 
limited at their stand-alone testing. Although the original authors (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 
1999) attempted to partially cover these deficiencies by introducing composite indexes and 
multiple thresholds to account for different levels of deterioration in the variable value, the 
statistical solution implemented by Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1997) proved to 
overcome most of the signal approach weaknesses and outperform it as EWS. They 
considered the early warning indicators as explanatory variables integrated in a binomial logit 
regression model, where the dummy dependent variable took value ‘1’ in case of crisis period 
and ‘0’ otherwise. The behavior of the independent was shaped by a logistic function in order 
to restrict the possible outcomes within the unit interval. The parameters estimated along with 
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the variables were interpreted as a measure of their contribution to the probability of 
experiencing a crisis, addressing the proper weight to each independent variable. This solution 
improved the model performances, both in-sample and out-of-sample, but at the same time 
introduced new dilemmas. For example, over the way in which the observed years following 
the burst of the crisis should be treated, as in those periods the values of the indicators are due 
to be deeply altered because of the stressing status of the banking system and the overall 
economy. Two possible treatments consist in either considering the periods in the aftermath of 
the financial collapse as simple tranquil periods, thus denying the existence of this issue, or 
eliminating them from the sample. Both solutions bear heavy costs, implying a reduced 
estimation efficiency and the loss of possible relevant information. With the purpose of 
avoiding the shortcomings due to be provoked by the so called post-crisis bias or crisis 
duration bias, a new econometric framework has entered the scene thanks to the effort of 
Bussiere and Fratzscher (2006) in their currency crises study. The model at issue is the 
multinomial logit approach that not only is an effective tool in avoiding the post-crisis bias 
but, in its first tests on financial crises, seems to outperform its predecessor in terms of 
predictive power (lower Type I and Type II errors). However, its application in the banking 
crises field is almost newly born and, despite its recent positive performances, its employment 
is still really limited. Nonetheless, even the author of this paper strongly believes that this 
path is the right one towards the development of a successful EWS for banking sector crises. 
Accordingly with what exposed above, with this work the author wants to provide further and 
stronger evidence on the existence of the post-crisis bias and the effectiveness of the logit 
approach, either binomial or multinomial, in handling it. Together with this task, I will 
investigate the link (if any) that binds the crisis duration with the quality of the EWS 
performance, in order to possibly draft valuable policy advises on how to fruitfully pool 
sample of countries on the basis of their inclination toward long-lasting crisis experiences. To 
my knowledge, a similar challenge has never been taken before. These goals are deemed to be 
achievable through various empirical steps. First of all, it is needed to justify the suspects 
raised over this post-crisis specific drawback. This can be reached through the implementation 
of a horse-race comparison between the performances of binomial models that either adopt a 
well-known post-crisis treatment (or implementing a multinomial model) or do not account at 
all for the crisis duration bias. During this phase there will be also plenty of room for 
collecting and interpreting the information returned by the models on the correlations that 
bind candidate determinants and the probability of an oncoming crisis. Nonetheless, any 
detected relationship should be treated with caution as it may not necessarily reflect a direct 
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causal link. Thereafter, by benchmarking the forecasting accuracy of binomial models on 
groups of countries discriminated on a crisis duration basis, I will target the duration-related 
goal. Conducting this latest exercise will possibly allow to shed a brighter light over the 
impact that the presence of long lasting crises has on the predictive ability of the model (in 
terms of AUC area) and the overall capacity of the proposed solution to tackle any emerging 
deficiency. In a second moment, the author will attempt to investigate which features of a 
country economic, political and institutional landscape are more correlated to the occurrence 
of long lasting crisis events. For this scope, a variable containing the average crisis duration 
over the explored time period and on a country basis would be regressed on a disparate and 
sizable list of variables in a linear and cross-sectional analysis. This experimental section 
should underline, if any, the characteristics of those economies that, on average, are more 
susceptible to durable banking crises and therefore, in implementing a specific EWS, should 
warmly consider to adopt a post-crisis bias appropriate solution. The outcomes of these tests 
are expected to provide valuable indications either on which statistical model would better fit 
the specific issues carried by the banking crisis prediction task and over how to set-up a solid 
early warning framework across several country-wide specifications.  
Empirical results from the first logistic session suggest that lagged increments in inflation, a 
higher vulnerability to sudden capital outflows, a soaring credit from financial to private 
sector and a greater level of illiquidity in the banking system are all signals connected with an 
increase in the likelihood of experiencing a systemic crisis. Negative fluctuations in the 
nominal official exchange rate and the net open position ratio, as proxy for banking system 
FX exposure, are expected to exert the same effect on the stability of a country’s financial 
sector, although these findings have not proved uniformly strong (see robustness tests). 
Beside considerations related to the individual determinants of a crisis, the binomial logit 
approach has been demonstrated valid in fulfilling the EWS duties, exhibiting satisfying post-
estimation metrics and generating AUC areas always greater than 0.70. The multinomial 
approach, as well, performing slightly better than its binomial version, has confirmed its 
authority in the role of EWS and provided valuable information over the forces responsible to 
hold a country within the crisis state. In this matter, an enduring economic recession, growing 
terms of trade, an increasing susceptibility to capital outflows and the degree of illiquidity of 
the banking sector proved all worthy signals of a prolonged permanence under stressed 
conditions. Despite the predictive differences between these frameworks, either binomial or 
multinomial, results firmly confirmed the quality deterioration caused by the post-crisis bias. 
During the second empirical phase, the outcomes from several binomial logit tests have been 
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plotted highlighting the positive relationship existing between an average crisis duration 
variable and the disruptive effect brought about by the crisis duration bias. The same duration 
variable, once employed as regressand in a linear regression analysis, has shown to be solidly 
and positively related to a country’s income per capita and its level of institutional quality.  To 
test the robustness of these findings, the whole empirical batch has been repeated employing a 
different crisis dating procedure (Laeven and Valencia, 2012). This double-checking process 
is useful not only to stress results under a different perspective but also to diversify the risk 
incurred by relying on a single crisis definition, undoubtedly affected by certain degree of 
subjectivity. Thanks to this additional analysis, main evidences on the post-crisis bias 
existence and the duration-quality relationship have been further corroborated and 
strengthened.   
The paper proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 will review some of the most important findings 
achieved so far in matter of determinants of banking crises and their most supported 
theoretical interpretations, in the attempt of providing the reader with an adequately accurate 
portrait of the dynamics that tend to breed banking sector fragility. A brief recap on which 
features are deemed to characterize countries’ tendency to prolonged crisis episodes is 
included too. In the closing part of this chapter I will also examine in detail the statistical 
models that gathered the strongest consensus in the role of EWS for systemic banking crises 
and among them the logistic ones that will play a leading role in my analysis. The specifics of 
the data sample, the dependent and the independent variables that will take part in the logistic 
exercises are all topics treated in Chapter 3, while the execution and results of the empirical 
tests are illustrated and described in Chapter 4. Robustness tests and sensitivity analysis, and 
the concluding remarks are exposed respectively in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6. 
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Chapter II: 
Literature Review 
2.1 An historical overview on systemic banking crises and their determinants 
The latest systemic shock experienced by financial markets and national banking sectors, 
culminated in the Great Recession which officially started in 2007, has been the ultimate 
proof of the deteriorating power that a fragile banking system has on the real economy of a 
country once a crisis burst. Although the magnitude of this crash has been considered lower 
just compared to the Great Depression of the late ‘20s, it represents only the tip of the iceberg 
in the history of systemic banking failures. In fact, to find the very first documented episode 
in this matter we must go far back to the 33 A.D. in the Roman Empire, when Tiberius Caesar 
had to face a widespread closure of banking houses generated by a mix of factors (Calomiris 
1989). Some of them are undoubtedly a thing of the past, as the sinking of some ships 
carrying uninsured cargo or the slave revolt, while others, such as liquidity draining by 
government-sponsored projects and international contagion, can be found even in some recent 
defaults. Since then the banking sector went through a radical evolution, however then as 
today it is still closely intertwined with elements of the real economy, the institutional and 
political frameworks. Its central position within the economic landscape of a country is the 
natural consequence of the intermediary role played by banks in the credit business. This 
feature made the banking system vulnerable from shocks of various origins, amplifying the 
scope of the study for those researchers that wanted to shed a light on the causes of a systemic 
banking default.  
As anticipated in the introductory chapter, the interest over this topic has reached a 
remarkable level just after the events following the Wall Street stock exchange crash on 
October 1929 an its multiple banking collapses. The economic turmoil generated was 
tremendous, eroding GDP, employment level, international trades and production in all 
sectors (although primary sector industries, as agricultural and mining, suffered the most). 
From 1929 to 1933, banks all over the United States experienced sequential runs to deposits 
that led to the erosion of the liquidity in the system and the consequent bankruptcy of more 
than 15000 banks (Caprio and Klingebiel, 1997). Eventually, the banking downturn 
demonstrated to be more painful than the stock collapse, as the fiscal cost to bailout the 
banking sector and the losses due to the economic slowdown were huge. Thereafter, one 
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major debate that developed during the 20th century was focused on the impact of the 
macroeconomic environment on the likelihood of a systemic banking crisis. For several 
decades after the Great Depression one major belief was that diffused runs on deposits were 
the results of depositors’ self-fulfilling expectations, as firmly sustained by Diamond and 
Dybvig (1983), and the asymmetric information between banks and depositors over the 
quality of assets owned by financial institutions. This explanation was supported by the 
classic view under which individual bank runs could become systemic just in the presence of 
three elements: opaque information over bank assets that could lead to runs over solvent 
firms, sequential servicing which allows depositors to withdraw their funds until the bank 
closes and the lack of a credible lender of last resort. Under these assumptions, widespread 
bank runs were detonated by information shocks that, eventually, could have threaten the 
stability of solvent but illiquid banks. If this was the case, systemic defaults were principally a 
matter of unwarranted “panic” and “contagion of fear” (Friedman and Schwartz, 1963; 
Kindleberger, 1978). Although this theory has proved able to partially describe the contagion 
at the base of the Great Depression, to most of the researchers in the field this explanation 
seems over-simplistic and scarcely applicable to the new wave of banking distress started in 
the early ‘80s. These years will also mark the beginning of a fertile period for the literature, as 
systemic crises proliferated until the latest unfamous events in 2007. Between the end of 
World War II and the early ’70s, the banking sector experienced a prolonged and steady 
tranquil period with almost no systemic crisis recorded. This peaceful timespan was 
principally due to a bunch of factors: a relative stable macroeconomic environment, low 
inflation, a spread economic growth, lax monetary policy, the introduction of the Bretton 
Woods system and a severe regulatory framework on banks’ balance sheets to prevent them 
from taking excessive risks. As these elements fell apart, starting from the dissolution of the 
peg system in 1973 to an increasing macroeconomic volatility (partially fostered by the oil 
shock) and a loosening of the capital and overall regulatory requirements to the banking 
sector, a new wave of systemic defaults spread in both emerging and advanced economies. 
  
2.1.1 Macroeconomic forces 
One of the first in empirically supporting the causal connection between some 
macroeconomic key indicators and banking sector fragility was Gorton (1988), whose 
findings have been later on strengthen by several major authors in the field. 
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His study on the US National Banking Era supported the business cycle view according to 
which diffused runs were the results of shocks in some economics fundamentals. Thus, rather 
than being detonated by panic, a systemic meltdown would be the consequence of an 
underlying economic recession. Under this “business cycle” theoretical framework, crises 
normally follow periods of economic boom characterized by constantly growing GDP and 
large availability of liquidity in the market. Along with the wealth of the economy, stock 
market prices and speculative investments on specific businesses soar, facilitated by diffuse 
over-optimism among investors. Apart from an expansionary monetary policy, this 
speculative bubble is financed through a credit boom that in its turn is allowed by lax lending 
standards, a permissive financial regulation and a weak supervision. Once the speculative 
bubble reaches its peak and bursts, falling asset values and increasing share of non-
performing loans, due to borrowers’ inability in paying back their obligations, would deeply 
deteriorate banks’ balance sheets that would found themselves stuck between the illiquidity of 
their assets and the liquidity of their liabilities (especially for current accounts). Once again, 
depositors would play a crucial role, as by withdrawing their funds they would relentlessly 
drain bank resources, leading the institutions towards illiquidity and insolvency. Several of 
these aspects can be also found in the latest US real estate bubble and similarly in the early 
‘90s in Japan. Although the analysis of Gorton (1988) was based on a country-specific sample 
concentrated on a restricted timespan, it had the merits of demonstrating that banking crises 
were not just a consequence of extraneous random variables but had their roots in the 
economic environment. As a consequence, they were, at least partially, predictable events. 
From this milestone on, several macroeconomic indicators have been considered in most of 
those studies dealing with the determinants of systemic banking crises. Few of them have 
demonstrated to be strongly significant in predicting distress periods. In the attempt of 
explaining the forces able to foster the oncoming of a crisis, Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache 
(1997) found to be relevant and positive correlated to the probability of experiencing a 
banking crash the following fluctuations: a slowdown or decrease in GDP growth lagged by 
one period, high inflation, high real interest rates, a sudden spike in capital outflow and an 
increasing M2-to-Reserves ratio (suggesting that bank exposure to currency crises plays a role 
in setting the stage for a banking default). This paper represents a masterpiece both because of 
the innovative econometric approach employed (multivariate binomial logit) and its 
significant findings on some main macroeconomic variables. The robustness of its results has 
been repeatedly confirmed by numerous authors that tested the indicators with different 
models and data sets. Among them, Hardy and Pazarbaṣioĝlu (1999), implementing a 
multinomial logit approach, proved the predictive capacity of some signals, as a sharp decline 
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in real exchange rates, a collapse in capital inflows and a decrease in the terms of trade.  A 
lagged reduction in the terms of trade, the ratio between exports and imports, is registered 
even by Davis and Karim (2008) which confirmed the variable, along with the growth rate of 
GDP, to be a valuable early warning indicator for full-fledged crisis episodes. Favorable terms 
of trade movements are due to proxy lower exchange rate-based market risk and lower 
chances of currency crisis. Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), in one of the most-cited literature 
pillars, suggest that good proxies for banking system vulnerability are a downward movement 
of the real exchange rate, a decreasing short-term capital inflows on GDP, a collapse of the 
stock market, as well as confirming the role played by GDP growth and interest rates. The 
influencing capacity of stock market movements on the stability of a national banking sector 
has been gradually validated by the works of several researchers (Caprio and Klingebiel, 
1997; Borio and Lowe, 2002). 
However, in spite most of the variables just listed are all backed by a robust theoretical 
explanation, only few of them, such as the annual growth rate of GDP, inflation and interest 
rates, gathered consensus in the vast majority of the papers. As an example, in contrast with 
what discovered by Kaminsky et al.(1999), Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (1997) proved the real 
exchange rate variable to be insignificant and vice versa Kaminsky et al.(1999) found 
irrelevant the contributions of the M2-to-Reserves ratio and the terms of trade. As anticipated, 
this dissonance among the results is mainly due because of core differences both in the data 
samples employed and in the very nature of the banking crisis episodes all over the world. 
First Latin American turbulences in the early ‘80s were mainly prompted by external factors 
and exchange rate policies while the saving and loans debacle in US (S&L) was much related 
to banking sector deficiencies, a weak regulation and supervision, financial liberalization and 
generous deposit insurance schemes (Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 2005). As a 
consequence of this variety, researchers have not circumscribed their sphere of action to the 
only macroeconomic fundamentals. In fact, despite a healthy economic environment is proved 
of being able to lower the vulnerability of a banking sector to a systemic crash, it could, to 
some degree, have the reverse effect by eroding incentives for prudent banking (Caprio and 
Klingebiel, 1997). Macroeconomic developments, in Gavin and Hausmann (1996) “chain” 
analogy, represent just one of the forces that exerts tension on the chain, the banking system. 
Thus, economy-wide factors would not tell us anything about which is the weakest link and 
which are the flaws of the chain. From this statement, it can be easily deduced that even credit 
industry specific features could play some role in determining the vulnerability of the 
financial system. 
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2.1.2 Microeconomic factors 
The relevance of the peculiar characteristics of the banking sector and its degree of 
connection with certain segments of the economy has been receiving attention from numerous 
authors during this last two decades. A one year lagged credit growth has been largely 
recognized as a strongly significant signal of oncoming banking issues. Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Detragiache (1997) emphasized credit growth role, especially if addressed to the private 
sector. The role of a credit boom in setting the stage for a systemic collapse has been recently 
confirmed by Navajas and Thegeya (2013) that tested the predictive power of some FSI 
(Financial Soundness Indicators). Among the most recent papers, the one developed by 
Boissay, Collard and Smets (2013) is noteworthy as it does not only confirms the widely 
approved positive correlation between an expanding credit availability and the likelihood of a 
systemic banking crisis but also, by entirely focusing on the credit boom phenomenon, further 
improves our knowledge on its relationship with a crisis. Larger credit growth rates seem to 
be associated to: higher crisis probability, smaller time-lag till the burst of the crisis and, in its 
aftermath, a deeper and longer recession. During my regression analysis on the average crisis 
duration there will be room to marginally verify this latest aspect. The credit boom related 
threat would eventually be amplified whether lending, as much as risk, was concentrated in a 
particular sector (“common risk factor”; Borio and Lowe, 2002). Lainà, Nyholm and Sarlin 
(2014) statistically proved it for the real estate market on a sample of European countries. As 
well as for advanced economies, lack of risk diversification is a major source of banking 
vulnerability even in emerging market countries where economy and so investments are 
normally focused on a limited bunch of businesses. Nonetheless, under these conditions, even 
the magnitude of the depression brought about by the crisis should exponentially inflate. 
Rojas-Suarez (1998), in their Latin America analysis, adopted an approach similar to the 
CAMEL framework used for the identification of individual distressed banks. They found to 
be good early warning signals: the loan-to-deposit interest rates spread, the deposit interest 
rate and interbank debt growth. Loan-to-deposit spread is just one of the proxies for financial 
liberalization that consolidates the theoretical belief that wants crises preceded by a deep 
deregulation of the financial sector and an increased competition among bankers. Findings in 
this regard are also those computed by Honohan (1997) that confirmed the validity of high 
loan-to-deposit spread and a high foreign borrowing-to-deposits ratio as good indicators for 
future banking instability. Even the currency mismatch between assets and liabilities that may 
emerge when banks borrow or lend abroad could have a potentially disruptive effect on the 
banking system profitability. As sustained by Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1997), if 
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banks have a foreign exchange open position they would be much more susceptible to 
domestic currency fluctuations. By lending at home in foreign currency they could rebalance 
their exposure towards foreign exchange volatility but it would mean loading with the 
currency associated risks the domestic loans, thus increasing the share of non-performing 
assets in case of exchange rate shock. Caggiano et al. (2014) empirically demonstrated these 
allegations, finding relevant and negative the relationship between the occurrence of a crisis 
and the net open position of the banking system, measured as the ratio between net foreign 
assets and GDP. Still looking at banking balance sheet figures, they even verified the role 
played by a liquidity ratio as early warning indicator and its positive correlation with the 
likelihood of a full-fledged default. This outcome is largely supported by theory too. Proxied 
by a soaring credit-to-deposit ratio, a drop in liquidity of balance sheet items is expected to let 
a bank more vulnerable to sudden massive deposit withdrawals (a run on deposits). Another 
study that adopted single bank balance sheet figures to the systemic dimension was the one 
carried on by González-Hermosillo (1999). They found out a relevant deterioration in 
performing loan quotas and capital asset ratios right before the burst of a crisis, fostering the 
theory that wants a crisis preceded by a cyclical downturn. A decrease in capital requirements 
is also expected to increase the exposure of banks to depositor’s run. To validate this 
intuition, Čihák and Schaeck (2007) tested and found significant a lagged decrease in the 
mandatory capital to risk-weighted assets, discovery that later on would be strengthen by 
Lainà, Nyholm and Sarlin (2014). In their pioneeristic study, Čihák and Schaeck used an 
aggregated version of bank ratios (FSI), which are usually taken into consideration during 
individual bank stress tests, as indicators of the overall system vulnerability toward shocks. A 
declining return on equity ratio had the strongest predictive power among the tested indexes 
(result confirmed by Navajas and Thegeya, 2013). 
Other banking sector elements that lie outside of pure technical ratios regard banking 
ownership, concentration and the presence of foreign banks within a national financial 
system. Caprio and Martinez-Peria (2000) gave empirical support to the first one of them, 
finding that state-owned banking sectors are more prone to systemic collapses. The belief 
upon a possible negative effect of the presence of foreign banks has been matter for debates 
too. These were suspected to raise crisis probability through contagion, by withdrawing 
resources from the host country’s branches to face problematic conditions at home, and their 
presumed short-term commitment in the local economic development. Worries that were 
empirically denied by Demirgüç-Kunt, Levine and Min (1998) that instead suggested a 
negative correlation between foreign banks presence and the risk of crisis. Ultimately, Beck, 
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Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2003) showed that banking crises are less likely where the 
sector is more concentrated and the regulation is favorable to competition. The role of 
banking structure is one of the most strongly debated issue that still does not find a widely-
agreed conclusion. Large banks are supposed to bring some advantages to the system: more 
diversified risks, enhanced profits allowing for a safety buffer in case of adverse shock and an 
easier supervision process (Allen and Gale, 2000). On the other hand, the so called 
“concentration-fragility” view wants larger banks to be deeply affected by moral hazard as 
most of the times their capital is implicitly guaranteed by the government, in a “too big to 
fail” fashion. Furthermore, a concentrated banking sector could deteriorate information 
transparency and, by gathering market power on the hand of a very restricted number of 
institutions, it may induce borrowing firms to take higher risks to compensate for less 
competitive lending interest rates. This latest hypothesis has been also empirically tested and 
validated by Boyd and De Nicolò (2003). This heated debate will inspire my decision to 
include and test in my duration analysis quite a few proxies for banking concentration. In any 
case, the topic keeps on being controversial, leaving room for future investigations. 
The role of competition, as well as concentration, has been a fertile field for controversy. 
Theoretically speaking, being a proxy for financial liberalization, a soaring competition would 
reflect a deregulation process being in place. For Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), the same 
role would be fulfilled by an increasing real interest rate and money multiplier, reflecting a 
reduction in reserve requirements. Within the same investigation framework, it was found that 
almost 70% of the crises studied since 1970 was preceded by some kind of financial 
liberalization within the previous 5 years. A loose regulatory framework on this matter could 
consist in measures such as the removal of interest rates ceilings on deposits, easy access to 
the credit market for non-bank financial firms, lower restrictions on capital requirements and 
riskier activities that allow for a higher flexibility in the resource allocation process. 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1997) and Arteta and Eichengreen (2000) found that 
internal financial liberalization, as proxied by the removal of interest-rate controls, increases 
the risk of a banking crisis, respectively in advanced and in emerging economies. These 
regulatory provisions would eventually foster the level of rivalry within the banking sector, 
inducing banks to squeeze their loan-to-deposit margin and gamble on risky investments to 
preserve their profitability. Such a shaped regulatory framework joint with a faulty 
supervision would inevitably make bank managers more prone to deficient or even fraud 
practices. Once the distress reaches unsustainable levels and the risk of insolvency becomes 
concrete, the management could still decide to keep on bidding on junk assets and pursuing 
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highly risky initiatives, magnifying bank exposures. This behavior could be the consequence 
of an extreme attempt to heal the bank balance sheet or to exploit the institution residual 
assets to realize a personal profit (looting). The whole risk taking process would be 
exacerbated by a widespread belief on the existence of an implicit governmental guarantee 
over bank capital. Caprio and Klingebiel (1997), in their comprehensive study on the causes 
and costs of systemic banking crashes, supported this view underlining poor management, 
weak supervision and fraud increases as major threats to the banking sector solidity, 
especially when associated to an ongoing liberalization. As this financial turmoil is due to 
follow a cyclical pattern, policy makers and bankers are expected to be able to refine their 
capacity to deal with these threats. However, market players, more often than not, during 
periods of strong economic growth risk to be affected by over optimism and disaster myopia. 
These states of mind are so frequent even because of the great time-space separating two 
crisis episodes, as if “…each generation would need to make is own mistakes.”(Kindleberger, 
1978). 
 
2.1.3 Institutional quality and regional studies 
So far, I have confined my theoretical recap exercise to macroeconomic and microeconomic 
dynamics. Nevertheless, the existing literature is not limited to these two categories. More 
recent papers have suggested a set of variables able to proxy, to a certain extent, the quality of 
the institutional framework in a country. In this direction, the effect of the presence of a 
deposit insurance, either explicit or implicit, has been widely discussed but, nowadays, results 
are still conflicting. A safety net on accounts should dissuade depositors to run on a solvent 
bank just as a consequence of an information shock, thus limiting systemic collapses by 
neutralizing self-fulfilling crises (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983). On the other hand, the 
presence of such a guarantee could trigger moral hazard and induce banks’ managers to give 
up with prudent practices for more profitable and risky opportunities (Kane, 1989). Indeed, 
the US Savings & Loan crisis of the ‘80s has one of its roots on the moral hazard created by 
generous deposit insurances (Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 2002). Moreover, as 
depositors and overall creditors feel their resources as guaranteed their surveillance effort on 
bank executives’ initiatives is due to get weaker, leaving greater room for mismanagement 
and market discipline deterioration. Both theoretical views are plausible and the empirical 
responses seem to sustain them equally. Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1997) showed a 
positive correlation between the presence of an explicit deposit insurance scheme and the 
likelihood of a systemic banking crisis. Thus, their findings would suggest that the negative 
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moral hazard effect on a banking sector outweighs the benefits deriving from a reduced risk of 
depositors’ runs. Similar conclusions are drafted by Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2004). On the 
other side, the reverse view is encouraged by the results shown in Eichengreen and Arteta 
(2000) and Lambregts and Ottens (2006), whose studies were both carried on a set of 
developing countries. In these papers, the presence of an explicit deposit insurance is found 
respectively: insignificant and negatively correlated to the probability of a crisis. Apparently, 
in these circumstances, the role of deposit insurance turns out to have a beneficial effect on 
the banking system of developing countries, where bank liabilities are more short-term and 
panic-driven runs represent a huge threat. The most exhaustive document in terms of deposit 
insurance is certainly the one developed by Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2002), as they 
test for different features and coverage degrees of deposit insurances on a world-wide dataset. 
The results of their multivariate logit model suggest that the presence of a deposit insurance is 
detrimental for the stability of a banking system as much as extended is the coverage on the 
deposits. Its negative influence on bank stability becomes gradually stronger once there 
subsist other elements as: a lax regulation on bank interest rates, a weak institutional 
environment or the governmental nature of the insurance. Beyond the mere existence of a 
safety net on accounts, Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1997) in their first work considered 
even GDP per capita and the law and order index as further proxies for the quality of 
institution. They proved to have a significant predictive power with a negative relationship 
with the probability of a crisis.  
With the same purpose, the level of transparency has been tested in the paper of Mehrez and 
Kaufmann (1999) whose findings confirm the intuitive existence of a linkage between a 
scarce degree of transparency and the likelihood of financial meltdown. Another variable 
considered proxy for the quality of institutions is the contract enforcement index, included by 
Arteta and Eichengreen (2000) in their emerging markets study. The evidence provided is 
weak and suggest no correlation between the variable and the onset of a banking crisis. 
Some studies distinguish from others because built on a regionally or economically restricted 
data set of countries. This effort comes as consequence of the expected substantial differences 
among the causes of systemic banking crises between industrialized and developing countries 
or eventually different geographical-related cluster. Theoretically speaking, this mismatch 
comes as a result of profound discrepancies between developing and mature financial sectors. 
On average, emerging market economies are shallower, thus with a limited capacity to absorb 
economic shocks. The few available financial instruments do not allow to properly hedge 
risks that most of the times are concentrated in a very condensed number of businesses, as real 
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economy still has to properly develop too. Regulation and supervision, as weak as the whole 
economic environment, are often ineffective in contrasting deficient management practices. In 
young financial sectors, few banks usually account for a large share of total assets while their 
liabilities have shorter maturity, therefore magnifying their exposure to sudden liquidity 
shocks (Rojas-Suarez and Weisbrod, 1996).Moreover, these banking systems tend to heavily 
rely on capital inflows and FDI (Foreign Direct Investments), leaving them vulnerable to 
unexpected high capital mobility. This was exactly the case of Thailand that experienced one 
of the unfamous Asian crises concentrated on the second half of the ‘90s. This episode 
appears as a perfect example of some of the elements just described. Banks used to borrow 
capitals from their foreign branches, subsequently investing them on the local real estate 
market and, thus, fostering the housing bubble through imported funds. High interest rates 
attracted huge amounts of resources from abroad, further fueling the economic boost of the 
country. Low regulatory standards and an aggressive lending (common aspect with advanced 
economies) eroded banks’ assets quality and multiply their exposure towards the booming 
real estate market. When the US dollar appreciated against some Thai trading partners’ 
currencies, the Thai exports went down as well, because of the dollar peg nature of the 
domestic currency. As speculators began to attack the fixed exchange rate and the capital 
inflows sudden turned in outflow, the country entered into a deep recession that climbed up 
until the burst of the housing bubble. Banking sector share of non-performing loans reached 
46% of total asset. Its bailout cost was estimated in around $60 billion or 42% of GDP 
(Ergungor and Thomson, 2005). 
Even the connection between the banking sector and the public finances seems stronger for 
developing countries. Arteta and Eichengreen (2000) showed that a fiscal deficit increase is 
associated with a higher financial instability in emerging economies, while the same variable 
resulted insignificant on the extended dataset employed by Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache 
(1997). A similar result on emerging market countries is obtained by Davis, Karim and Liadze 
(2010) that found the relevance of the fiscal surplus-to-GDP ratio to be secondary in strength 
just to the widely accepted GDP growth. 
The real case previously exposed helps me introducing another topic concerning systemic 
banking crises over which researchers have given their responses. The aim of this effort was 
to clarify whether a particular exchange rate regime could increase the vulnerability of a 
financial system to external shocks. Even on this issue theory is divided. A floating exchange 
rate is expected to absorb, to some degree, external shocks on capital flows and terms of trade 
(as in the Thai episode). This view is supported by the works of Gavin and Hausmann (1996) 
and Mendis (1998). The insulation effect is not the only benefit attributed to a flexible regime. 
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Its presence, in fact, could detain banks’ management from borrowing in foreign currency, as 
their exposure would skyrocket in case of domestic currency devaluation. On the other hand, 
a fixed rate, being affected by a lower volatility, especially for developing countries, would 
reduce the deterioration risk of bank balance sheets particularly exposed towards currency 
mismatch between assets and liabilities. Some weak empirical evidence supporting this view 
is brought by the paper of Arteta and Eichengreen (2000). A peg system could also help to 
discipline policy makers (Eichengreen and Rose, 1998) and to promote prudent banking 
practices as a consequence of the absence of a lender of last resort (Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Detragiache, 2005). Overall, the faint outcomes in both directions seem to provide further 
support to the findings of Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) that proved a causality relationships 
going from banking crises to currency ones, not vice versa. Thus, empirically speaking, there 
is not any robust proof for either exchange rate regime to shelter or induce to systemic 
banking crises. It is rather demonstrated that the pressure triggered by a banking crisis on a 
country’s currency could force policy makers to abandon a peg exchange rate, being the only 
way to properly carry out their role as lender of last resort. 
This is exactly what happened in Mexico, during the so called “tequila” currency crisis. In 
November 1994, a sudden and steep capital outflow increase started eroding the Mexican 
foreign exchange reserves as a result of the central bank decision to defend the peg exchange 
rate with the dollar. Despite Mexican governmental finances appeared to be sound, the capital 
flight seemed to be triggered by political chaos and the choice by US Fed Reserve to raise its 
interest rates. Once the speculation on the dollarized peg became unbearable for the Mexican 
foreign exchange reserves, the central bank decided to leave the peso freely floating. By the 
end of December 1994, the currency devaluated by 35%. The peso collapse led to a strong 
increase in inflation and interest rates. Banking system came out affected both by its foreign 
exchange exposures and the hiking share of non-performing loans, as more and more 
borrowers could not afford the high interest rates. Ultimately, the government had to bailout 
the financial sector for up to 20% of GDP. Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), in their widely-
cited work, verified the huge economic cost associated to the so called twin crises, i.e. when 
banking and currency crashes occur simultaneously. What still does not find solid empirical 
support is the role of international shocks, as in this case the Fed interest rate movement, with 
respect to the likelihood of systemic banking crises. A restrictive monetary policy and an 
economic recession in industrialized economies are expected to negatively influence the 
economic environment in developing countries, especially dollarized ones. This was the case 
of Mexico in 1994, as well as other Latin American countries during the ‘80s. Eichengreen 
and Rose (1998) showed a significant positive correlation between monetary policy tightening 
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or a growth slowdown in industrialized countries and financial sector fragility in developing 
ones. However, a later study by Arteta and Eichengreen (2002) on an extensive crises dataset, 
including the second half of the ‘90s (and therefore the Asian crises), found the same 
correlations to be weaker and less statistically significant. This result inevitably challenges the 
role of external factors as determinants in a comprehensive EWS for systemic banking crises, 
while strengthen the belief that banking crises evolve overtime. This is probably the main 
reason because both industrialized and developing countries could graduate from sovereign 
defaults but not from banking crises (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008). The quest over the topic is 
still widely open, as the variety of its future research scenarios. 
 
2.1.4 Findings and beliefs over crisis duration 
Until now, I paid much attention on the causal forces that could lie behind the inception of a 
banking meltdown. However, unsurprisingly, some of these elements do not merely 
contribute to the burst of a crisis but they also play a role in determining the length of the 
downfall. As a consequence, most of the variables listed above that will not find place in my 
logistic analysis will still have a role in my forthcoming crisis length inquiry. The peculiar 
features of my duration analysis let my work cross the thin but still concrete boundaries that 
divide the EWS quest and the empirical branch aimed at shedding light on the severity of a 
crisis and the forces that drive it. With this purpose, Wilms et al. (2014) in their recent paper 
collected the most significant drivers of the real impact of a systemic banking crisis and tested 
them against nine different crisis severity measures, three of which regarding the event 
duration. They found that pre-crisis GDP per capita is strongly positively correlated with all 
their duration-based dependent variables which, in turns, suggest that defaults experienced by 
richer countries tend to last longer. Though my duration variable will be based on a raw mean 
computation instead of a GDP trend analysis, as the case of Wilms et al. (2014), I expect to 
find some matching results as well as brand-new empirical evidences. To a smaller extent, 
even financial openness and currency crisis related indicators demonstrated a positive and 
significant relationship with the severity of a crisis. However, the sign of the first correlation 
is controversial and matter of debate. Financial integration may offer risk-sharing 
opportunities and reduce the risk carried by a sudden stop in capital flows (Abiad et al., 2009). 
On the other hand, a loose regulatory framework on cross-border transaction may open the 
way for international financial shocks to spread into a country banking system. Similarly 
controversial is the role played by financial depth. More developed financial systems may 
suffer exponential losses during stressed period but at the same time deeper ones may provide 
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a wider range of instruments to hedge from risk or optimally allocate it to stronger players, 
allowing a faster recover (Yanagitsubo, 2004). A steep growth of the financial sector size 
could highlight the creation of a credit bubble and an ongoing process of financial 
liberalization, along with lending standards rapidly deteriorating to permit the industry to 
keep on growing. Boissay, Collard and Smets (2013) found that greater financial booms are 
associated with longer and more painful recessions. Even exchange rate related downward 
fluctuations are expected to prolong a crisis period, especially when these movements set the 
stage for a currency crisis. The concomitant occurrence of banking and balance of payment 
crisis (twin crisis) would exacerbate the real costs and the persistence of the default (Berg, 
1999; Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999), especially when a consistent share of the country 
economic players is heavily exposed towards foreign currency liabilities. 
An exhaustive literature review in matter of the mechanisms hiding behind the severity of 
banking crisis falls outside the scope of this empirical work. However, each of the forces 
described above will be represented, to some extent, by proxy indicators during my duration 
analysis. 
2.2 The statistical models 
The previous paragraph should have provided the reader with a summary up-to-date 
understanding on the forces behind a systemic banking crisis and their usefulness in building 
an effective early warning system. The aim of this section of the paper consists in gaining a 
better knowledge on the features of the main forecasting models employed so far. This further 
step would ultimately lead us to the end of the historical review and the introduction of the 
material purpose of this work. Similarly to what exposed on the determinants of a crisis, not 
all the early warning models that I will briefly describe further on would play a role in the 
execution of my empirical exercise but their description still remains valuable for the sake of 
a satisfactory knowledge over the empirical topic. 
2.2.1 The signal extraction approach 
The signal framework has been firstly developed and introduced by Kaminsky and Reinhart 
(1999), in their influential and widely-cited study on the twin crises. As briefly exposed in the 
introductory chapter, this method consists in testing individual variables behaviour against 
tranquil period values all over the 24 months preceding the burst of a crisis. If the variable 
exceeds a certain threshold, it would trigger a crisis signal that becomes true just if, within the 
following 24 months, a real crisis would really be registered. Otherwise, the variable would 
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generate a false signal. The threshold is set to minimize the noise-to-signal ratio that looked 
like the ratio of false alerts to good warnings over a horizon of 24 months prior to the crises. 
The predictive power of the individual signals is then compared to each other performances 
on the basis of three yardsticks: the noise-to-signal ratio, the percentages of Type I and Type 
II errors, the conditional probability of crisis conditioned to a signal of the variable. A perfect 
indicator would correctly predict all crises without issuing misleading warnings. 
Unfortunately, in selecting the threshold for a variable, the analyst must compute a trade-off 
between Type I and Type II errors. A smaller threshold will inevitably lead to less Type I 
errors, as the number of missed crises decreases, and more Type II errors, as the number of 
false alarms increases. Although this choice should be made weighting the preferences of the 
policy maker, between the cost of missing to predict a crisis and the one incurred by 
implementing unnecessary measures because of a false alarm, Kaminsky and Reinhart opted 
for a statistical criterion like the noise-to-signal ratios (choice later on contested by Gaytán 
and Johnson, 2002). This methodology implicitly assumes that the cost of missing to identify 
a crisis (Type I) is higher that the loss generated by taking unnecessary precautionary 
initiatives because of an elevate number of false alarms (Type II). Even if the authors did not 
effectively own this kind of information. Under this assumption the three variables that 
graduated as the most significant ones have been the real exchange rate, the equity prices and 
the M2 money multiplier. The signal approach was subsequently adopted by various authors 
for their research exercises. Among them Rojas and Suarez (1998) that tested the predictive 
performance of aggregated banking ratios (CAMEL) on the likelihood of systemic banking 
crises. This early warning system has its key strengths in its transparency and relative simple 
understanding, which make of it a policy maker “friendly” approach, and the opportunity it 
offers to highlight early warning features of individual indicators. Benefits that seem to be far 
outweighed by drawbacks when the aim of the model is not anymore to measure single 
signals but to build a comprehensive early earning model based on a set of explanatory 
variables. First of all, the predictive accuracy of the model is deeply questioned. Either in the 
same original work (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999) or in other papers adopting the univariate 
signal approach, the share of correctly predicted crises within a horizon of 24 months after the 
issue of the signal is always lower than 30%. Performances that remain poor even when the 
test is conducted on out-of-sample crisis episodes. To improve the accuracy of the univariate 
version of the model several authors employed composite indicators. Borio and Lowe (2002) 
constructed aggregated indexes that would trigger a crisis signal just if all the variables 
included in the composition have crossed their thresholds simultaneously. Differently, Davis 
and Karim (2008), in their comparative framework on banking crises EWS, created composite 
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indicators that gathered together variables on the basis of their individual NTSR (noise-to-
signal ratio) and could issue a signal without necessarily that all the individual indexes 
contained in the composite have surpassed their cut-off. To some extent, this solution proved 
able to increase the model accuracy, by reducing both Type I and Type II errors, and to 
account for the aggregated effect of the variables included in the composite index. Other 
critics were directed to the very nature of the thresholds that separated a tranquil period 
behavior from a crisis one. Firstly, a single cut-off did not allow to register any difference in 
the marginal contribution of a variable to the probability of an oncoming crisis. In practice, 
the predictive role of an indicator should be relevant although its value has not fully reached 
and overcome a specific threshold, but for example just barely touched it. Secondly, the 
selection of common cut-off values for a cross-section dataset, considering them uniformly 
valid for all the countries included in it, appears to be an over-simplistic and inefficient 
solution. As suggested by Davis and Karim (2008), the optimal threshold may differ along 
with the peculiar structural characteristics of the institutional, political and economic 
environments of a specific country. As a consequence, the choice of country-specific 
thresholds would be preferred and could consistently improve the indicators performance. 
Finally, Gaytán and Johnson (2002), in their EWS review, stressed the inability of the signal 
approach to consider regional differences and to carry out study on the severity of a crisis.  
Most of the criticisms raised on the model, especially those regarding its lack of predictive 
efficacy, are not draft on absolute terms but have been highlighted by the comparison with 
other early warning frameworks. Indeed, few of them demonstrated their superior 
effectiveness in the role of early warning systems for banking crises and keep on gathering 
large consensus among the researchers committed in this field. 
 
2.2.2 Binomial Logit Approach 
Among them there surely is the multivariate logit approach, the one that probably experienced 
the most widespread diffusion since its first application on systemic banking crisis prediction. 
This model, as well as its probit version, is essentially a binary dependent variable model and 
its employment in predicting a banking crisis is based on the assumption that such events can 
be proxied by a response variable having just two possible outcomes (0, 1). The likelihood of 
a crisis is determined by a function of a vector of explanatory variables (𝑥𝑘), which represent 
the right-hand side of the regression while their resulting coefficients (𝛽𝑗) reflect the marginal 
contribution of each variable to the output probability. Logit and probit stand for two different 
cumulative distribution functions (G), standard logistic and standard normal, that ensure that 
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the estimated probabilities are strictly between zero and one, for all possible values of the 
parameters and their associated variables. 
𝑃(𝑦 = 1|𝑥) = 𝐺(𝛽0+ 𝛽1𝑥1+. . . +𝛽𝑘𝑥𝑘) 
0 < 𝐺 < 1 
The goal of the model is to understand which is the effect of the variables 𝑥𝑘 on the response 
probability 𝑃(𝑦 = 1|𝑥), which in our case it is the likelihood of experiencing a crisis. In other 
words, the aim of the regression is to obtain the parameters  𝛽𝑗   that can tell us some features 
of the relationship between 𝑥𝑘  and the dependent variable. Information as the direction of the 
relationship and its statistical significance con be easily disclosed. However, because of the 
non-linear nature of the underlying relationship, the variables coefficients do not exactly 
match with the marginal magnitude of the regressors, as the case for a simple linear 
regression, and so cannot be strictly interpreted as the marginal increase or decrease in 
probability associated with a specific variable. To extract this information it would be 
necessary to run twice the regression, with and without the variable in question, while keeping 
all the other variables fixed and take the difference between the results. In other words, all the 
variables 𝑥𝑘  must be taken into consideration. In any case, the effect exerted by the variable 
under scrutiny on the crisis probability would depend on the country’s initial crisis 
probability. Whether the likelihood of a crisis would already be extremely high (or low), a 
change of a variable would not deeply affect the outcome of the regression, vice versa, 
starting from a probability of 0.5 would mean attributing a much more considerable weight to 
a movement of the variable.  
A limited dependent variable model does not rely on an ordinary least squares estimator to 
obtain the parameters of the regression but on the maximum likelihood method (MLE) that 
better fit with a non-linear relationship. The MLE returns those coefficients that maximize the 
log-likelihood function: 
ℒ(𝛽) =∑ ℓ(𝛽)
𝑛
𝑖
=∑ {𝑦𝑖 log[𝐺(𝑥 𝑘𝛽)] + (1 − 𝑦𝑖) log[1 − 𝐺(𝑥 𝑘𝛽)]}
𝑛
𝑖
 
, being 𝛽 the vector of coefficients and 𝐺, in case of logit approach, the logistic function:  
𝐺(𝑥𝑘𝛽) = exp(𝑥𝑘𝛽) /[1+ exp⁡(𝑥𝑘𝛽)] 
Although even the probit approach has been adopted in the attempt of building an early 
warning system for systemic banking crises, as demonstrated by the work realized by 
Eichengreen and Arteta (2000), the multivariate logit model has definitely achieved a greater 
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success and implementation throughout the whole empirical literature on banking crises.  As 
already anticipated, Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1997) have been the first in adopting a 
multivariate logit approach for studying banking sector crises. In their empirical session, they 
faced some obstacles in adapting the econometric model to the specific scope. As explained 
further on, the ways to tackle these complications still represent major opportunities for future 
improvements. First of all, they had to decide how to treat the years of data following the 
onset of a crisis, as in this period the relationship between the explanatory variables and the 
probability of a crisis would almost certainly be distorted by the crisis itself. They proposed 
two different solutions to tackle the problem, both capable to solve it even though at some 
costs. One of these consisted in eliminating all those observations following the year of 
banking crisis. This choice has the expensive drawback of wasting large amount of 
information (for example regarding multiple crises). Alternatively, they considered the 
possibility of discarding just those observations included between the burst and the end of the 
crisis. This solution had some advantages in terms of data gain and predictive power, as the 
dataset would have been considerably enlarged, but the choice of when the crisis was due to 
end was almost completely arbitrary, leaving room for the inclusion in the model of 
observations that could still be affected by the protracted influence of the crisis event. Since 
its first appearance, this phenomenon has been known by the author dealing with its treatment 
under the name of post-crisis bias (Bussiere and Fratzscher, 2006) or crisis duration bias 
(Caggiano et al., 2014).Another possible source of weakness (specifically speaking reverse 
causality) was the timing of some explanatory variables. Since their very first application, 
variables as the GDP growth and the credit growth were lagged by one or even two years 
(Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 1997) to both: better fulfill to their role as early warning 
indicators and avoid any kind of endogeneity bias. The preference towards lagged indicators 
further developed throughout the last decade until some of the most recent works, in which all 
the explanatory variables included in the regression were at least one year lagged (Davis, 
Karim and Liadze, 2010; Caggiano, Calice and Leonida, 2014).The endogeneity problem was 
not the last barrier that Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1997) had to overcome to set the 
model for the prediction of banking crisis. The presence of country fixed effects is often 
useful as it allows to account for the country-specific changes in the outcome probability. 
However, their employment requires that all those countries that have never experienced a 
crisis would be excluded by the dataset. Measure that would have implied a remarkable loss 
of information for the authors, whose cross-country database would have been more than 
halved. Under these circumstances, they preferred to preserve the entire dataset at the cost of 
removing the fixed effects. Other concerns were much less related to the specific features of 
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the binomial logit while commonly shared by all the methods developed for the same 
purposes. Among them, the need to define a threshold probability presented again. With these 
regards, Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2000) adopted a methodology based on the loss 
function of a policy maker. Once some additional information, as the costs of taking 
preventive action and experiencing a crisis, are known this method is expected to be a more 
valid alternative to a selection based on a statistical index as the noise-to-signal ratio. Whilst a 
trade-off between missed crisis and false alarms is still necessary, a threshold selection 
centered on economic considerations would make the predictor much more efficient in the 
eyes of who is expected to finally exploit the model: the policy maker.  
Once these issues have been set-aside, the binomial logit and probit models gave proof to 
outperform in terms of prediction accuracy most of the other models, whether tested in or out-
of-sample. Since its first application as early warning system for banking crises, the efficacy 
of the multivariate logit approach has been repeatedly confirmed by those researchers that 
decided to rely on it to test their empirical hypothesis, as well as those authors that tried to 
compare different frameworks in a horse race fashion. Among them, it is worth mentioning 
the works of Davis and Karim (2008) and Alessi et al. (2015). Respectively, the first one 
benchmarked the performances of the signal and logit approaches for banking crises only, 
while the second one confronted nine different EWS together for a wider spectrum of 
financial crises (currency, sovereign debt, etc.). In both cases the models were ran on common 
cross-country datasets, crisis definitions and set of explanatory variables. Whereas the signal 
model demonstrated a better shape for a country-specific application (Davis and Karim, 
2008), given the chance to set the threshold on a country by country tailored way, the 
multivariate regression models uniformly confirmed their superior predictive efficacy over all 
the other methods (in terms of correctly predicted crisis and non-crisis years). Nevertheless, 
both authors wisely promote prudence in relying entirely on a model rather than another. 
EWSs should fit as much as possible to the preferences of a specific policy maker and its 
reference country (Davis and Karim, 2008), while being supported by other models to further 
strengthen their forecasts robustness (Alessi et al. 2015). Despite the promising performances 
expressed so far by the binomial logit approach, its limitations still appear debilitating. In this 
regard, its multinomial version apparently provides room for further improvements. 
 
2.2.3 Multinomial Logit Approach 
Once again, as was the case for the binomial model, the multinomial innovation has been 
prompted by the emerging need of halting the remarkable accuracy leakages generated by the 
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drawbacks affecting previous empirical frameworks. More specifically, some researchers tried 
to cope with the phenomenon that just recently has been reported under the names of post-
crisis bias or crisis duration bias and whose compromising effects were known since the very 
first applications of the binomial multivariate models. The dilemma was centered on which 
modus operandi should be implemented to deal with the abnormal behavior of some 
explanatory variables in the years right after the crisis bust. As previously introduced, the way 
such data would be treated could lead to a biased model, whether the EWS was left free to 
erroneously consider them as tranquil period values, or to a relevant loss of information, in the 
case the researcher decided to tackle the problem by simply discarding the troubling periods 
(or, drastically, all the observations following a crisis episode). It was exactly the compelling 
necessity of handling differently the years right before the crisis that led Hardy and 
Pazarbaṣioĝlu (1999) to adopt, for the first time, the multinomial logit approach on the 
prediction of banking crises. Although, their exercise was not devoted at the resolution of the 
post-crisis bias, it still represents the very first attempt to introduce a third possible outcome 
in the regression, beyond the classical tranquil and crisis status supported by the binomial 
approach. The multinomial logit approach still belongs to the family of the limited dependent 
variable models but differently from its binary version it allows for more than two outputs. 
Thus, the additional outcome status for the response variable would introduce a higher 
flexibility, rather than being constrained to define a year either tranquil or crisis regime. 
Considering the post-crisis bias hypothesis, with three possible outcomes (S): one 
representing tranquil periods (S=0), another for the crisis times (S=1) and the additional one 
addressing post-crisis years (S=2), the theoretical outlook of the logit model would be as 
follow: 
𝑃(𝑌 = 𝑆|𝑋𝑘) = ⁡
𝑒𝛽𝑆𝑋𝑘
1 + 𝑒𝛽1𝑋𝑘 + 𝑒𝛽2𝑋𝑘
 
 
, where 𝑋𝑘is the vector of the regressors. If the tranquil period (Y=0) is adopted as control 
group than the vector of the coefficients 𝛽1 will represents the marginal effect of the 
independent variables 𝑋𝑘 on the probability of being in crisis period relative to the probability 
of being in a tranquil period. By the other hand, 𝛽2 will represent the marginal contribution of 
the independent variables 𝑋𝑘 on the probability of being in a post-crisis period relative to the 
probability of being in a tranquil period: 
𝑃(𝑌 = 0) = ⁡
1
1 + 𝑒𝛽1𝑋𝑘 + 𝑒𝛽2𝑋𝑘
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𝑃(𝑌 = 1) = ⁡
𝑒𝛽1𝑋𝑘
1 + 𝑒𝛽1𝑋𝑘 + 𝑒𝛽2𝑋𝑘
 
𝑃(𝑌 = 2) = ⁡
𝑒𝛽2𝑋𝑘
1 + 𝑒𝛽1𝑋𝑘 + 𝑒𝛽2𝑋𝑘
 
 
As a consequence, the relative probabilities are simplified as follow: 
𝑃(𝑌 = 1)
𝑃(𝑌 = 0)
= 𝑒𝛽1𝑋𝑘  
𝑃(𝑌 = 2)
𝑃(𝑌 = 0)
= 𝑒𝛽2𝑋𝑘  
 
The maximum likelihood estimator keeps on being valid for the multinomial as well as the 
binomial logit model, given their common non-linear features. 
This model has proved efficient in solving the crisis duration bias problem both in case of 
currency and banking crises. For what may concerns currency crises, Bussiere and Fratzscher 
(2006) developed a benchmark exercise between binomial and multinomial logit models, 
showing that the second one consistently outperforms the first. The advantages brought by the 
third possible outcome are visible through an overall increase in the predictive performance of 
the model, with a higher percentage of correctly predicted crises and a lower number of false 
alarms, as well as the full exploitation of the data on the post-crisis period. Results that have 
been lately confirmed in the banking crises field by the work of Caggiano et al. (2014) that 
tested the multinomial logit approach on a dataset of low-income Sub-Saharan countries. 
Similarly to the previously described work on currency crises, they compared the 
performances of the multinomial and the binomial models. Likewise, they obtained strong 
responses on the predictive superiority of a multinomial EWS, thus providing further proof of 
the existence of a duration crisis bias and the validity of this model to efficiently manage it. 
These improvements translated into a higher share of correctly predicted crisis (more than 3% 
of increment) and a lower percentage of false alarms (of around 2 %), relative to the binomial 
performance. Caggiano et al. (2014) adopt an additional method to measure the goodness-of-
fit of the model. They draft the ROC curve (Relative Operating Characteristic; Figure 1) along 
with each regression executed. It plots the ratio of true crisis signals (True Positive, 
Sensitivity) against the ratio of false alarms (False Positive, 1-Specificity) for any possible 
threshold value. The result is a curve passing by the origin (0, 0) and the point (1, 1) whose 
extreme outcomes represent the worst and the best predictive performances. Respectively, a 
model with null predictive capacity (random guess) would produce a diagonal ROC curve 
starting on the origin and crossing the graph till the right corner point (1, 1). In this case, the 
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AUC (Area Under the Curve) would be equal to 0 and the model could tell as nothing more 
than a random guess on the forecasted event. 
Conversely, the perfect prediction method 
would lead to a ROC curve that starting in the 
origin would reach the right corner (1, 1) 
passing by the left corner (0, 1). Thus, the 
AUC would be equal to 1 and the model 
would be able to optimally forecast the crisis 
event. Therefore, as much as the AUC 
produced by the EWS is close to 1 as better 
would be its predictive accuracy. 
Even under this valuation criteria, the multinomial model confirmed its improved predictive 
ability, with an AUC equals to 0.77 compared to 0.69 of the binary approach (Caggiano et al. 
2014). 
At the light of the progresses showed so far by this multiclass empirical framework, it is 
reasonable thinking at it as the EWS that could effectively move the empirical frontier on 
systemic banking crises towards a comprehensive model. However, its recent and scarce 
applications in the field do not provide enough evidences to already consider it completely 
reliable as a new standard. A secondary goal of this paper is to provide further support to the 
role of the multinomial logit model as best-in-class EWS for banking sector defaults. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: ROC curve and AUC illustrations.
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Chapter III: 
Setting the Empirical Stage 
3.1 A definition for “systemic banking crisis” 
Building a banking crisis variable requires a critical but necessary decision to be taken. The 
main complexity of this task derives from the very nature of the systemic event itself. It does 
not take place at a specific point in time but spreads out over a period whose boundaries are 
blurred. Identifying with precision its beginning and ending date is not possible as the 
economic phenomena (e.g. bank run)  that could highlight the presence of an ongoing 
systemic meltdown could in turn have been the effects themselves of a preceding period of 
turbulence and local banking insolvency. Counterintuitively, the crisis could also be dated too 
early in the case its climax still has to be reached. Therefore, my analysis, as the ones 
conducted by the other authors in the field, should rely on a specific crisis definition that 
inevitably presents some degree of subjectivity. Rogoff and Reinhart, along with their 
comprehensive study on financial crises “This time is different”(2009), provide one of the 
most updated and recognized systemic banking crisis databases that covers the period 
between 1860 to 2014 (in its very last version). The definition proposed hereby splits banking 
crises in two different kind of events: “… (I) bank runs that lead to the closure, merge or 
takeover by the public sector of one or more financial institutions; (II) and if there are no runs, 
the closure, merging, takeover or large-scale government assistance of an important financial 
institution (or group of institutions), that marks the start of a string of similar outcomes for 
similar financial institutions.” (Rogoff and Reinhart, 2009). The authors defined as “systemic” 
just those events described by the first definition (I) while the other crises (II) were considered 
as “…milder episodes of financial distress.” (Rogoff and Reinhart, 2009). Upon these 
indications we have taken into account just the crisis dates that fall into the first crisis 
category (I), thus considering severe and systemic events only.  
A strong limitation carried by this database regards the quite restricted spectrum of countries 
therein covered. With these premises, matching data availability from both left and right hand 
side variables of the regression would drastically shrink the count of effective countries 
included in my empirical process. To cope, at least marginally, to this sort of information 
leakage I relied on alternative dating sources that could have been integrated with the original 
one provided by Rogoff and Reinhart. First of them is the data set built by Caprio and 
Klingebiel (2003) which, according to Rogoff and Reinhart (2008), is “…authoritative, 
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especially when it comes to classifying banking crises into systemic or more benign 
categories”. In addition, to double-check my crisis integration process and make it as more 
robust and aligned as possible with the crisis definition described above, I have taken into 
account the papers of Boyd et al. (2009) and Chaudron and de Haan (2014), both comparing 
different techniques of banking crisis dating. The systemic crashes confirmed as such by all 
these three sources and compatible with the definition adopted by Rogoff and Reinhart would 
be reported by my crisis dependent variable. At the same time, those countries which 
demonstrated to have suffered just mild non-systemic defaults have been included in the base 
group of countries which have never experienced a systemic wide meltdown (e.g. Gabon, 
Guyana, Jordan). All those countries that lie outside of either one of these two eventualities 
have been excluded from the sample to preserve the integrity of the dependent variable. The 
same treatment has been reserved for those countries whose systemic banking crises, although 
strongly confirmed, had not a unanimously agreed duration (e.g. Republic of Congo, Niger, 
and Sierra Leone). This decision has been taken in order to avoid that misinterpreted 
information could bias the crisis duration analysis that will take place after the logistic 
regressions. This integration framework allowed me to preserve a satisfying size for my data 
set and enhance its heterogeneity by recovering information on several low income countries 
that otherwise would have been discarded. 
Built upon these assumptions, the dependent variable accounts for 76 crisis episodes and a 
total of 324 years of crisis (out of 2380 total annual observations) within the full sample of 
countries. By restricting the data set to its smaller version (1998-2013) the amount of crisis 
episodes falls dramatically to 15 periods and 92 overall crisis years (within a total of 704 
annual observations).  
 
3.2 Explanatory variables 
The selection of the independent variables has been inspired and dictated both by the 
theoretical framework behind the determinants of banking crises and data availability. In 
particular, my decision has been inspired by some of the most prominent papers in the field, 
almost mirroring the variable selection made by Caggiano et al. (2014) which, in turn, has 
been driven by the choices of Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache in their well-cited study back 
in 1997. As exposed previously during the review of the literature, these variables have found 
widespread empirical support from most of the previous banking-related studies and could be 
grouped in two main categories: macroeconomic and real sector concerned ones, financial and 
monetary the others. The following indicators belong to the first group: 
 36 
 
- GDP growth: it proxies the economic wealth of a country and, consequently, the 
social fabric within which the banking system is embedded. A stagnation or decline of 
GDP should anticipate difficulties of the borrowers to respect their liabilities towards 
banks and therefore a deterioration of banks’ balance sheets, as the amount of 
deteriorated assets soars. At the same time, a prolonged and sustained GDP growth 
could highlight an economic bubble being in place during the periods right before the 
burst of a systemic default; 
- Inflation: a low rate of inflation indicates a relatively stable macroeconomics 
environment which, in turn, contributes to a greater solidity of the banking sector. 
Furthermore, a spike in inflation is meant to foster the formation of an economic 
bubble as borrowing gains popularity to the detriment of saving; 
- Nominal Exchange Rate Depreciation: excessive foreign exchange risk exposure by 
the banking sector may leave it vulnerable to sudden movements of the exchange rate. 
In other terms, it could reveal vulnerability of the banking system to currency crisis; 
- Change in Terms of Trade: a terms of trade drop is due to be one of the main factors 
behind bank insolvency (Caprio and Klingebiel, 1997). Even if this finding has not be 
strongly confirmed in all the empirical results achieved so far (see Kaminsky and 
Reinhart, 1999), the significance of a sudden deterioration in an economy’s terms of 
trade in anticipating a banking collapse has been widely proved. Evidence that 
becomes more robust in developing countries and small open economies; 
The second group of variables includes all those related to the monetary specifics of a country 
or the characteristics of the financial sector, with a focus on deposit banking institutions: 
- M2 to Total Reserves: this ratio is a measure to the resistance of an economy, as well 
as its banking system, to sudden capital outflows (balance of payment crisis) and the 
country’s ability to defend its currency. A higher value should correspond to a greater 
probability of financial system crisis; 
- Credit-to-GDP growth: with credit intended as domestic credit provided by the 
financial sector, this ratio should proxy credit growth and financial liberalization (Pill 
and Pradhan, 1995). It should help detecting the existence of a credit bubble and/or 
decreasing lending standards and, as a consequence, should have a positive correlation 
with the probability of entering in a crisis; 
- Banking Capital-to-Assets (CAR): built through the aggregation at the country level of 
individual banks’ balance sheets data, this ratio should indicate the leverage of the 
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banking sector. A greater CAR would lower crisis likelihood by strengthening banks’ 
ability to face credit deterioration and unexpected losses; 
- Liquidity ratio: a higher banks’ credits to banks’ deposits ratio, thus high illiquidity, 
would mean lower resistance of the system to sudden massive deposit withdraws and, 
as a consequence, a greater probability of a disruptive run followed by a crisis; 
- FX Net Open Position: it is included to highlight any currency mismatch between the 
value of banks’ assets and liabilities which, in turn, should represent a threat to the 
banking system in case of domestic currency depreciation; 
The variables just described are listed in Table 1a, along with their main statistics, and will be 
included in the first logit tests. Others, instead, will be introduced and involved at a later 
stage, during the average duration regression analysis. The choice over which indicators to 
include in the first benchmark session has been certainly shaped by the wish of reproducing 
some of the most robust achievements in terms of crisis determinants and possibly 
contributing to their deeper understanding. Moreover, by keeping the model in a relatively 
simple form, its comparison to other EWS would be facilitated while not necessarily 
sacrificing a significant amount of predictive power. However, as a matter of fact, data 
availability constraints have definitely set the final boundaries of the selection process. With 
this limited but heterogeneous handful of variables I could avoid to compromise the length of 
the period under examination and with it the whole list of collected countries. The only 
exception has been made for the Capital-to-Assets ratio (CAR) whose variable (Leverage) 
application has been restricted to the period 1998-2013. This solution has been adopted in 
order to both minimize the information costs incurred by including the variable in the 
regressions and stress the model under completely different conditions in terms of time-span 
and covered countries. All the explanatory variables employed in the logistic regression have 
been winsorized at the 1 and 99 percentiles to shelter the results from influential outliers. 
As the main purpose of the paper is to build and test a EWS, all the variables will be lagged 
by one period, with the only exception of GDP growth which is expected to exhibit relevant 
early behaviors from two years prior the onset of the crisis. This settings is even aimed at 
avoiding the occurrence of reverse causality effects as the crisis itself could affect 
contemporaneous variables values. 
Most of the data collected were obtained from the World Development Indicator database, 
made by the World Bank, and the International Financial Statistics from the IMF. When data 
were missing, central bank statistics and other country-specific sources were used as 
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supplements. Data sources in details, along with their associated variables and a brief 
description, can be found in Appendix 4. 
 
 
3.3 The data sample  
The initial wider version of the panel data set, considering the limitations carried by both 
dependent and independent variables as previously exposed, accounts for 70 countries over a 
34 years-time span, from 1980 to 2013. In its narrower form, dictated by the availability of the 
Leverage ratio, the data sample includes 44 countries whose yearly observations cover the 
period 1998-2013. Both versions consist in a world-wide mix of countries that have been 
strictly selected on the basis of their available data. As a consequence, among them, there are 
all sort of industrialized and developing economies accounting for profoundly different 
features. While the full data set is formed as a heterogeneous mix of developing and 
industrialize economies, its reduced version, being built on the constraint imposed by the 
Leverage availability, is constituted mainly by wealth countries. This feature is expected to 
exert some weight over the empirical estimations. With the crisis dates provided by Rogoff 
and Reinhart, out of the total count of countries (in the full data sample) 16 do not report any 
systemic crisis event, either because they have never experienced a banking default during the 
examined period or because these events have been considered non-systemic under the 
authors’ definition of banking crisis. This bunch of nations will serve as a base group. As the 
count of countries involved in the tests shrinks to allow the assimilation of the Leverage 
variable, even its base group has been scaled down to a total of 7 clusters. For what may 
concern the composition of the sample and its degree of heterogeneity, in its final and 
extensive version, it includes a wide spectrum of economies ranging from deeply undeveloped 
to industrialized and wealthy ones. According to the national classification groups based on 
income per capita provided by the World Bank, the full data set accounts for: 8 Low Income 
Countries (LIC), 22 Low-Middle Income Countries (LMIC), 20 Upper-Middle Income 
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Countries (UMIC) and 20 High Income Countries (HIC). LIC presence completely disappears 
once the sample is downsized in its smaller form. An in-depth specification of the income 
classification criteria and a complete list of the countries included in the exercise can be found 
in the data Appendix 1. A world map illustrating the pool of countries included in the full data 
sample grouped by income per capita can be found in Appendix 3. 
This collecting effort was strictly due as a higher number of observations was desirable, 
especially considering the infrequent nature of the systemic banking distress episodes 
compared to other financial crises (e.g. balance of payment crises). 
3.4 The exercise step by step 
Before entering deeply into the details of the empirical tests and their outcomes, I would 
briefly provide the reader with a summary glance over the purposes behind their execution. In 
order to understand whether a post-crisis bias effectively materializes when adopting a 
binomial model, I will treat the crisis years following the first in two ways: by considering 
them just as a tranquil period observations or by excluding them from the regression. This 
latest approach, already implemented by Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1997), should 
provide a shelter, even though marginal, to the distortion effect produced by the burst of the 
crisis on the variables values. Additionally to this task, during the following robustness 
checks I will implement a multinomial logit model that, along with its predictive 
performance, should be able to further clear the fog gathered around this phenomenon and 
eventually strengthen the role of this model for future early warning practices in the field. The 
statistics, shown in Table 1b, can be interpreted as a very first evidence of an underlying post-
crisis bias. In fact, the averages of the variables differ across the three dependent variable 
status suggesting that mixing all the crisis periods without any discrimination could set the 
stage for a data mistreatment and the consequent misleading results. Once the first binomial 
benchmark session would be over, an additional exercise that would possibly provide useful 
information in this direction consists in taking into account of the average crisis duration on a 
country basis and produce multiple comparable results by partitioning the sample tested at 
different duration thresholds. Plotted in line charts, the AUC areas coming out from these 
regressions would allow us to graphically observe whether discarding post-crisis years does 
effectively increase the model predictivity and if these resulting benefits change along with 
the inclusion in the tested sample of increasingly lasting crisis episodes.  
Whether in this step a correlation between crisis duration and models performances does 
effectively exhibit, in the last part of the empirical phase I will try to dig further this 
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relationship by looking for aspects in the economical, institutional and political frameworks 
of a country that could exert any influence on the likelihood of being subject to longer lasting 
(and damaging) banking defaults. In its entirety, the empirical path just exposed has the 
ambitious aim of both contributing to the improvement of the empirical understanding of a 
specific issue such as the crisis duration bias  and to provide scientific-robust advice in an 
EWS set-up process for those policy makers willing to efficiently employ it. 
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Chapter IV: 
Results 
4.1 A multivariate binomial benchmark 
In this section I will report the outcomes of the binomial logit model, including in the 
regressions most of those primary variables (see Table 1a) that allowed me to exploit the data 
sample in its extensive form. The impact of Leverage is separately tested as the data set needs 
to be downsized to the period covering the last sixteen years of observations, between 1998 
and 2013, for nearly two-thirds of the original number of countries. 
As anticipated, the first set of logistic regressions is made with a binary dependent variable 
(SBCRR) which has been built upon the information provided by Rogoff and Reinhart (2009) 
in their comprehensive database on international financial crises. SBCRR takes the value of 
‘1’ in case of systemic crisis and ‘0’ during tranquil periods. Since the very first estimation, 
all the explanatory variables employed will be lagged by one period, with the only exception 
of GDP growth whose indications are expected to be valuable two years in advance. Table 2  
and Table 3 illustrate the results for the model applied to the full data sample which accounts 
for a total of 70 countries all over the time-span going from 1980 till 2013. The two tables 
differ from each other just for the treatment reserved to the crisis periods after the first. 
Respectively, in Table 2  post-crisis years have been set at ‘0’, in other words normal times, 
while in Table 3 these observations have been dropped from the sample to limit the expected 
bias.  From a maximum of eight independent variables, I have gradually removed the ones 
that showed the weakest correlation with the dependent variable, reaching a minimum base of 
four indicators. Due to its widely-diffused presence within the literature landscape, GDP 
growth has been kept as base variable whatever performance it has exhibited during the tests. 
All the explanatory variables have been winsorized at the percentiles 1 and 99 to limit the 
influence of outliers on the results. 
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Most of the results coming from these first set of regressions confirm the findings of the 
majority of the papers draft in this field. Quite surprisingly, the role of GDP growth as a 
determinant for a systemic banking crisis did not prove to be strong with all the specifications 
tested, with the null hypothesis that has never been rejected at a satisfying significance level 
(lower than 10%). On the other hand, the positive sign of its coefficient is in line with the 
economic cycle view that wants a financial debacle preceded by a wealth bubble, inflated by 
an excessive credit availability and a viral over-optimism among economic players. 
As the crisis inception date gets closer (within the previous 12 months), the relationship 
between the variable and the likelihood of entering in a crisis state turns negative, suggesting 
that the bubble has finally burst and the economy has started to spiral down into the recession. 
In light of this performance, the two-year lag, twice with respect to the other variables, 
revealed excessive, as a movement of the GDP gains statistical consistence as much as we get 
closer to the crisis outburst date. In fact, once tested contemporaneously on the same set of 
countries, the variable turns highly significant. This thesis finds support in the conclusions 
reached by Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1997) and Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996) whose 
analysis have been conducted on a similar world-wide heterogeneous country data set. 
Nonetheless, the robust result of the contemporaneous variable could be affected by reverse 
causality, thus reflecting the influence of the crisis on the economy rather than vice versa. A 
decline of GDP growth has demonstrated to manifest with a significant lag prior to a crisis for 
specific cluster of countries built on regional or income criteria (Caggiano et al., 2014). 
Inflation performed significantly better in all the specifications with a p-values often lower 
than 1% and the expected positive correlation with the probability of crisis. These evidences 
confirm the negative impact in the stability of a banking system provided by weak 
macroeconomic conditions during the period right before the oncoming of a crisis. The 
positive coefficient of the Liquidity variable shows that the more the banking sector is 
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exposed to credit risk the more it would be vulnerable to credit deterioration and therefore to a 
systemic meltdown. The ratio between banking sector credits on its deposits resulted deeply 
statistically significant in all the regressions, confirming its relevance as early warning 
indicator. As suggested by Caggiano et al. (2014), this relationship is especially threatening 
for emerging economies where, on average, banks are heavily exposed towards a restricted 
number of industries. As well, developing countries should be even much more sensitive to 
foreign exchange fluctuations as they are more than often characterized by dollarization and 
the financial sector balance between credits and liabilities is exposed to FX risk. However, 
employing the FX Net Open Position I could not confirm its relevance as powerful 
determinant for a banking crisis. As expected, a declining Net Open Position increases the 
likelihood of experiencing a crisis but the results displayed in the table are not able to strongly 
corroborate the statistical significance of this relationship. For what may concern M2-to-
Reserves, it was expected to show a positive correlation with the outcome probability and so it 
is. This ratio, which works as a proxy for capital outflow vulnerability, proved statistically 
relevant in all the specifications, strengthening the theoretical allegations towards a sudden 
fall (rise) in capital inflows (outflows) harmful effect on a country’s banking sector. 
Depreciation and Credit-to-GDP growth variables, as well as the previous ones, demonstrated 
to be valid early warning indicators. Nonetheless, their relationships with the output variable 
can find an explanation in the main theoretical frameworks. In fact, a drop in the nominal 
exchange rate is expected to destabilize the balance sheets of those institutions characterized 
by heavy foreign exchange exposures. Vice versa, the positive correlation showed by Credit-
to-GDP growth confirm the role of a credit boom in setting the stage for a systemic banking 
crisis, at least as far as one year prior to the dated onset of the crisis. With these regards, the 
differences in the treatment reserved to the post-crisis years markedly affected the variable 
significance level, supporting the idea that the deceiving influence exerted by the 
mistreatment of these distressed observations can extend beyond the sole model predictive 
quality. Nevertheless, caution is required, as Credit-to-GDP variable is unique in this feature. 
Ultimately, a change in the Terms of Trade did not incisively emerge as early warning 
indicator performing poorly in both full-sample exercises. Its flimsy result can find a marginal 
explanation in the weak presence of low income developing countries within the sample. 
 
 46 
 
 
 
 
 47 
 
 
The second set of estimations carries two major differences with respect to the one previously 
commented. Firstly, the variable Leverage enters the scene in a regression, along with the 
main eight variables. Its correlation is not statistically significant and the positive sign of its 
coefficient is not anticipated by theory: a larger share of capital with respect to assets is due to 
act as a shelter and thus reduce the likelihood of a crisis. However, the model shows how this 
phenomenon does actually manifest getting closer to the time in which the crisis is expected 
to start. In fact, once employed the variable value in the current period T, the relationship with 
the probability of a crisis turns out to be effectively negative. I will not dig deeper into this 
peculiarity as it falls outside the scope of the exercise. Secondly, the data sample under 
scrutiny is restricted both in terms of covered time-span and of countries. In particular, low 
income countries completely disappear from the sample unbalancing its composition towards 
wealthy economies. As a result of this metamorphosis, the latest episodes, concerning the 
notorious Great Recession, acquire considerable weight. Therefore, not only the amount of 
observations drastically shrinks but even the results drawn upon them are expected to differ 
from the ones obtained using the entire data set. Looking at the outcomes of the regressions 
displayed in Table 4 and Table 5, the variable Depreciation is no longer statistically 
significant and its relationship with the output probability vary across the six different 
specifications. Looking closely at the residual data, once the sample has been squeezed out, it 
becomes pretty evident the fact that by leaving out many low income countries and overall 
large time intervals subjected to exchange rate shocks, the sample shape has profoundly 
changed. Notably, even the notorious episodes known as the Mexican “Tequila” crisis and the 
Asian crises, largely characterized by a drastic drop in the domestic currency valuation, are 
excluded in this occasion. Therefore, it comes weaker the effect of a currency collapse on the 
probability of observing a systemic banking crisis, as it should weight the most for those 
countries whose economies strongly rely on foreign currencies. This is especially true for all 
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those economies, included in the full sample, that are dollarized and are consequently much 
more sensitive to exchange rate fluctuation. As well as for Depreciation, this reason is due to 
be also at the base of the robust insignificance reported by the Net Open Position. Essentially 
because low income countries’ financial systems have normally worst net foreign assets 
balances and therefore are more exposed to a sudden negative shock of the domestic currency. 
A part from these two explanatory variables, the others confirmed their relevance (or 
irrelevance) as early warning indicators, highlighting some possible similarities in the 
ingredients necessary to set the stage for a systemic-wide banking crisis across different 
countries and time periods. A little criticism can be raised on the sign of the coefficient of 
Credit-to-GDP. Unexpectedly, in these last regressions it turned negative, contradicting the 
role of a credit boom in setting the stage for a banking crisis. What it is deemed to be one of 
the most supported theoretical belief, however, can vanish if in period T-1 the available 
domestic credit has already started to drop. If this is the case, this result appear much more 
plausible as once the credit bubble burst the lack of liquidity in the system is expected to 
make the economic recession, as well as the banking instability, even worse. Rogoff and 
Reinhart systemic definition is not exempt from this possible drawback as the event deemed 
to signal the beginning of the crisis episode, such as a run or a large-scale government 
assistance, could be the result of a downward spiral started well before. As partially verified 
with the full data set, the regression resulting coefficients do not change along with the 
deletion of the post-crisis observations. 
In order to test the goodness of the models, I mainly relied on the in-sample predictive 
accuracy and the magnitude of the area under the ROC curve (AUC) generated by the model. 
Since post-estimation measures, as the percentage of correctly predicted crises (Sensitivity), 
Type I and Type II errors (respectively missed crises and false alarms), strictly depend on the 
subjective selection of the threshold probability needed to trigger a crisis signal, I will give 
priority to the model that has been able to produce the greater AUC. The ROC curve is more 
informative than the post-estimation classification table since it summarizes the predictive 
power for all possible thresholds. Furthermore, I took into account three statistical tests: the 
pseudo R-squared, the Wald chi-squared statistic and the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). 
The first two of them, the pseudo R-squared, as suggested by McFadden, and the Wald 
statistical test, convey measures of the model quality by comparing the performance of its 
unrestricted version to its intercept-only one. Higher values for these metrics would 
correspond to a better goodness-of-fit of the model to the data. The AIC criterion provides a 
relative measure of the quality of a model, computing together the log likelihood of the 
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estimation and the number of estimated parameters. Being the sign of the likelihood term 
reversed, smaller AIC values mean greater quality in the peculiar model specification (relative 
to the others being tested).  Back to my results, it seems fairly striking that the models tested 
on the downsized data sets performs better that the ones which exploited all the available data. 
These conclusions are backed by an increased pseudo R-squared and Wald chi-squared. In all 
probability, by deeply reducing the data set heterogeneity and the number and variety of 
systemic events included within the tested period (15 episodes against 76 for the extended 
sample), the resulting cluster of countries is more efficient than naively pooling together all 
the available information. As sustained by van der Berg et al. (2008), this feature is 
particularly distinctive of financial crises. Because of their mutating tendency across countries 
and time-spans, these phenomena should be studied in optimal clusters that account for their 
specific characteristics. For what may concern the in-sample predictive ability check, to 
optimally perform this duty it would be necessary additional information on the costs that a 
government should bear in case of failing to signal a crisis and the cost of implementing 
useless preventive actions once a crisis is detected by the model. In other words, it would be 
needed the utility function of the policy maker. As a consequence, modelling a EWS on a 
country-specific basis represents the ideal solution to maximize its effectiveness, as confirmed 
by several authors. However this grade of specificity falls outside the real purposes of this 
work. Being unable to shape this threshold on the basis of a policy maker’s preferences, I 
decided to set the cutoff probability equal to the ratio between the available crisis episodes 
within the data sample and the total amount of observations (once the variables have been 
lagged). Consequently, these percentages range from a maximum of 3.4% to a minimum of 
2.1%, respectively for the full and reduced data sets. Based on these premises, by dropping 
the years following the burst of the crisis we obtained better results than simply considering 
these observations as tranquil periods. The improvements highlighted in Table 6 undoubtedly 
suggest the existence of the so called post-crisis bias. Taking into consideration just the 
models accounting for this issue, the widest specification from Table 3 correctly detected 
about a half of the crises, while the rate of false alarms (Type II error) amounts to a 
percentage of about 74.6%. Overall, the model correctly predicts a satisfactory 73.8% of the 
observations. By adding Leverage and restricting the data sample, as done in Table 5, the 
overall predictive ability of the model remarkably increases to a percentage barely lower than 
80%. Both, the rate of crisis correctly predicted (Sensitivity) and the rate of non-crisis periods 
detected (Specificity) increase to 71.4% and 80.1%, respectively. In both cases, full and small 
sample, the models implementing the bias solution outperformed the remaining models in all 
the post-estimation metrics exposed above .To definitively identify whether a clear 
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performance boost effectively emerges and which test actually outperformed the others, I 
looked to the ROC and the Area Under the Curve (AUC). Independently of the data set 
employed, the models adopting a dependent variable adjusted for the crisis duration bias 
(Panel 1b, Panel 2b) proved better than by erroneously considering post-crisis years as normal 
periods (Panel 1a, Panel 2a). On the basis of this measure, the quality of the regressions run 
on the reduced data sample fairly overcome the one executed on the full set, with a maximum 
AUC of 0.80 (reached by dropping the post-crisis observations; Panel 2b).  
Table 6. Post-estimation statistics for all four binomial logit exercises. 
Rogoff and Reinhart (2009) 
 
Binomial 
Metrics Treatment No Treatment 
Full Data Sample (1980-
2013) 
Sensitivity (%) 50.7 49.3 
Specificity (%) 74.6 72.3 
Overall accuracy (%) 73.8 71.6 
AUC 0,7222 0,7064 
Small Data Sample (1998-
2013) 
Sensitivity (%) 71.4 71.4 
Specificity (%) 80.1 74.6 
Overall accuracy (%) 79.9 74.6 
AUC 0,8008 0.7632 
4.2 Graphing the Duration Effect 
The following exercise shares the same spirit of the previous logistic analysis as it aims at 
adding further weight to the post-crisis bias hypothesis and providing, if any, a graphical 
representation of the relationship that binds together the duration of a crisis and the quality of 
the model in predicting these events. To the best of my knowledge, an exercise set up as 
follow has never been implemented before. More practically, I have tried to strengthen the 
convictions over the existence of a crisis duration related bias through plotting the AUC areas, 
as supreme measure for the model accuracy (being independent of any policy maker utility 
function), of multiple binomial logit regressions whose data sample has been discriminated on 
the basis of a crisis duration variable. This latest indicator has been computed as the average 
length of time of all the crises experienced by a country during the time-span covered by the 
full data set (1980-2013). The resulting graphs will show whether the predictive quality of the 
model moves along with an increasing presence of long-lasting crisis episodes in the sample. 
In fact, by gradually including countries whose average crisis duration is increasingly higher, 
there should be greater room for the post-crisis bias to manifest and influence the predictive 
goodness of the specification. As done for the previous benchmark exercise, the same 
regressions will be run both dropping the post-crisis observations and treating them as 
tranquil times in a horse race fashion. Whether a post-crisis effect does effectively persist and 
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magnify along with the raising duration of the crises under scrutiny, the exclusion of the post-
crisis observations should benefit to the predictive ability of the evaluated models. Because of 
the comparative meaning of this empirical session, the regressions therein are carried on 
considering only the more extensive form of the data sample and the eight initial explanatory 
variables illustrated in Table 2 (winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles). The reference crisis 
definition is the one proposed by Rogoff and Reinhart (2009), already employed in the 
previous logistic tests. The information reported for each logistic regressions has been limited 
to the AUC areas produced by their ROC curves and the number of countries involved in the 
regressions. 
Graph 1 illustrates the results for a total of seven regressions. At each marginal increment in 
the Crisis Duration Threshold, all the countries that have experienced defaults whose average 
duration is equal or below this cutoff are included in the tested data sample until its maximum 
size is reached (70). A couple of exceptions has been made for the Central African Republic 
and Israel whose systemic crises did effectively start during the late 70s, protracted within my 
period of interest and ultimately vanished during the first observed decade. In order to avoid 
to exclude these observations or, even worse, simply truncate the crisis and align its beginning 
with the one of the covered period (1980-2013), I have considered these two episodes in their 
integrity when computing the respective average crisis duration value. The count of countries 
per regression is reported under the X axis of the graph in brackets. What stands out pretty 
evident from the graph is the irregular trend of the model accuracy while the list of countries 
keeps on inflating towards its maximum dimension. At a first glance, this result could firstly 
seem quite abnormal as more countries should mean more observations and therefore more 
useful information. However, this efficiency argumentation becomes quite pointless when 
Graph 1. Effect on AUC areas of longer-lasting crisis episodes. 
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studying financial crises because the factors expected to lie behind these events can 
profoundly change from country to country. Van den Berg, Candelon and Urbain (2008) 
found that not only a richer list of countries could not improve the model efficacy but it could 
even deteriorate it. This is exactly what we can observe from Graph 1. Their findings suggest 
that optimal clusters of countries can be even smaller than the regional dimension that has 
been purpose of studies for several researchers. Therefore, the AUC deterioration reported by 
both models can be the detrimental effect of the additional countries which effectively spoil 
better shaped clusters. Another plausible explanation consists in the existence of a negative 
relationship between the average crisis duration and the model predictive accuracy. 
Differently from the “optimal cluster” interpretation, this hypothesis could also explain why 
the spread between the two plotted lines gradually widens together with the average crisis 
duration of the countries included and, simultaneously, the average duration of the whole data 
sample climbs to its peak. In fact, at least partially, the trigger behind this quality deterioration 
seems to coincide with the post-crisis bias and this phenomenon magnifies along with the 
increasing length of the crises included in the sample. The spread between the two lines in 
Graph 1 confirms the effectiveness of the treatment adopted in tackling this problem. 
Nonetheless, there could exist frameworks (as the multinomial logit model) that could 
effectively allow a greater power recovery rather than just roughly discarding the suspected 
observations. Whatever solution is adopted, the take-away conclusion that emerges from the 
widening gap between the dotted and the flat lines suggests that the greater is the average 
crisis duration of the entire sample the more a proper treatment for the post-crisis years 
becomes beneficial for the sake of the predictive quality of the EWS. The performance 
differential between the two post-crisis treatments stabilizes once the data sample has almost 
regained its complete form. To a slightly limited degree, an ever increasing post-crisis bias is 
also what stands out from the exercise displayed in Graph 2 that plots the outcome of a test 
similar to the previous one. The main executive difference consists in the criteria that lays 
behind the partitioning of the data sample. While previously the list of countries grew as the 
average duration requirement was getting looser, this time it is the number of post-crisis 
periods (years of crisis after the first) per country that determines the data sample 
composition. Here, too, countries which have frequently gone through long-lasting systemic 
distress periods weight more than other countries, heavily affecting the improvement brought 
in by the duration bias solution. Once again the post-crisis bias hypothesis finds further 
support. Indeed, the model implementing the bias solution always outperforms the simple 
binomial framework and their performance gap hits its climax once the most crisis affected 
countries are taken into consideration. 
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             Graph 2. Effect on AUC areas of post-crisis periods. 
 
 
4.3 The hidden forces behind crisis duration 
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of the impact of the crisis on a country’s economic environment. Wilms, Swank and de Haan 
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correlated with the effectiveness of the supervision effort over the relative banking industry 
(Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 1997). Under these assumptions and being it readily 
available for my entire set of countries I used it as base explanatory variable for the oncoming 
linear regressions. My dependent variable, previously employed as Crisis Duration Threshold 
in executing the AUC-Duration graphical exercise (Graph 1), is the average crisis length on a 
country basis and therefore constant for each of them. To accommodate this feature and the 
purpose of this test, the data set ceases to have a panel data shape while turning into a simple 
cross-sectional data sample with a single observation per country. As anticipated, the 
explanatory variables have very diverse natures among each other, ranging from indicators of 
specific features of the financial sector, such as its concentration, liberalization and depth, to 
institutional quality indexes. Their main selection criteria is focused on the existing literature 
in matter of real impact of banking crises, as efficiently summarized by Wilms, Swank and de 
Haan (2014), complemented with a pinch of the author’s own curiosity. A part from those 
variables that were static by nature, as for the Latitude, the others had to be averaged over the 
entire sample (1980-2013), where available, or across a restricted time-span. Table 7 lists the 
whole set of variables involved in this analysis along with their coverage period, a brief 
description and the rationale behind their involvement. 
Table 7. Independent variables for the duration-related OLS linear regressions. 
Variable Rationale Description Period 
GDPmean 
Wealth, 
Institutional 
Quality 
GDP per capita in US dollar $ (current 
value) * 
1980-2013 
Latitude 
Geographic 
position 
Absolute value of the latitude of a 
country. Ranges from 0 to 1 (south to 
north) 
- 
OECD Membership Binary variable. 2013 
Conc_Beck 
Banking Sector 
Concentration 
Fraction of assets held by the three largest 
banks * 
1988-1997 
Conc_Caprio 
Banking Sector 
Concentration 
Share of deposits held by the five largest 
banks * 
1980-1997 
Conc_3 
Banking Sector 
Concentration 
Fraction of assets held by the three largest 
banks * 
1997-2013 
Conc_5 
Banking Sector 
Concentration 
Fraction of assets held by the five largest 
banks * 
1997-2013 
RCC Credit Boom 
Total credit booms years by country based 
on the variation of real credit per capita 
from its long term trend 
1980-2011 
Qcluster 
Institutional 
Quality 
Weighted means of economic, political 
and legal institutional quality indexes (1-
5) 
1990-2010 
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Gov_Quality 
Institutional 
Quality 
Composite of: voice and accountability, 
political stability, government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of 
law, and corruption. From 0 to 1, from 
worse to better governance. 
1998 
frac_ent 
Financial 
Liberalization 
Number of entry applications denied as a 
fraction of the total number of 
applications received from domestic and 
foreign entities. 
2001 
restrict 
Financial 
Liberalization 
Sum of four measures that indicate the 
degree of restriction of bank activities in 
the securities, insurance and real estate 
markets and ownership and control of 
nonfinancial firms. From 1 (unrestricted) 
to 4 (prohibited) 
2001 
rr 
Financial 
Liberalization 
Ratio of reserves required to be held by 
banks 
2001 
bfree 
Financial 
Liberalization 
Indicator of relative openness of banking 
and financial system * 
1995-1997 
KAOPEN 
Financial 
Openness 
Also known as the Chinn-Ito index is an 
indicator of a country’s degree of capital 
account openness. * 
1980-2013 
BCreditGDP Financial Depth 
Ratio of domestic credit to private sector 
provided by banks on GDP * 
1980-2013 
HHI 
Market 
Concentration 
The Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index 
(Product HHI), is a measure of the degree 
of product concentration. * 
1995-2013 
CurrencyCount Currency Crisis 
Total years of currency crisis experienced 
by the country. 
1980-2010 
SovereignCount 
Sovereign Debt 
Crisis 
Total years of sovereign debt crisis 
experienced by the country. 
1980-2010 
ConflictCount Armed Conflict 
Total years of armed conflict experienced 
by the country. 
1980-2013 
Foreign 
Foreign 
Ownership 
Percentage of banking system assets in 
banks that are 50 % or more foreign 
owned. 
2001 
State State Ownership 
Percentage of banking system assets in 
banks that are 50 % or more state owned. 
2001 
Muslim 
Cultural 
discriminant 
Variables that capture the percentage of 
population that is Muslim.* 
1988-1997 
Catholic 
Cultural 
discriminant 
Variables that capture the percentage of 
population that is Catholic.* 
1988-1997 
*Average over the period. 
Unsurprisingly, most of these independent variables show strong multicollinearity with each 
other, especially among those sharing the same rationale. Therefore, bunching them together, 
although not affecting the predictive power of the models, would result in radically altered 
coefficients, as information redundancy skyrockets. By keeping just the average GDP per 
capita (GDPmean) as base variable and combining it with a different predictor at a time, I 
partially stem the phenomenon. Nonetheless, it still manifests pretty evident with some 
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specific variable (Table 8). Another possible source of estimation bias could come from those 
countries which do not carry any information over their systemic banking default episodes 
(just mild episodes). This cluster of countries that 
was considered as part of the base group in the 
previous logistic regressions is mostly composed by 
low and middle income economies. It is a fact that 
some of these, particularly due to their tiny size, have 
never experienced a truly disruptive systemic episode 
or at least no one that could eventually fall under the 
crisis definition adopted by Rogoff and Reinhart 
(2009). However, including them in the linear 
regressions as free-crisis countries could distort the 
resulting coefficients. Therefore, the regressions have 
been run just considering those countries which had 
at least one documented systemic crisis, leaving out 
the entire base group previously employed during the 
logistic tests. Despite the information cost of this 
decision is burdensome, this solution was required to 
preserve the robustness of the analysis and the 
veracity of the relationships delivered by the regressions. 
The number of countries involved in each regression (given each variable availability) and the 
resulting coefficients along with their t-statistics are displayed in Table 9. 
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Information related to the goodness-of-fit of the various models have been omitted in order to 
focus the reader’s concentration on the correlations showed by the tested variables. The 
displayed outcomes do not seem to carry robust and valuable information as most of the 
variables resulted poorly correlated to the average duration dependent variable. Nevertheless, 
the positive relationship showed by GDPmean is statistically significant in most of the 
specifications and backed by the results obtained by Wilms et al. (2014), which found the 
correlation between the crisis duration and the income per capita to be the strongest among all 
their duration-related results. A part from the income-related variable, just the Qcluster 
variable, proxy for the quality of a country’s institutional framework, proved faintly 
significant. These results suggest that countries with healthy institutions and above average 
wealth per capita are more subjected to long-lasting banking crises, once they have already 
plummeted in it. Interestingly, in spite of being backed by past empirical evidences, none of 
the four variables expected to measure the degree of financial liberalization, (frac_ent, 
restrict, rr, bfree), together with the count of currency crises (CurrencyC) have been able to 
show a significant relationship. As anticipated, behind the unsatisfactory report produced by 
the regressions there could be the negative influence of collinearity bias. With this regard, the 
author decided to report, just beneath the resulting coefficients from each specification, the F-
Statistic of the individual analysis. This metric, outcome of a statistical test (F-test) in which 
the test statistic has an F-distribution, conveys the capacity of rejecting the joint hypothesis 
that the coefficients are both zero. Along with the correlation between the coefficients and the 
variance inflation factor (VIF) for each pair GDPmean-Variable(IV), as displayed in Table 8, 
the F-statistic would become a valuable tool to highlight the presence of detrimental levels of 
collinearity between the tested variables. Understanding if a problem of this nature is actually 
affecting the results would not represent a priority whether the aim of the exercise was to 
learn more about the quality and the goodness-of-fit of each specification. Nonetheless, as the 
true goal of the linear regressions consists in highlighting any significant relationship between 
dependent and independent variables, the presence of undisputable signs of multicollinearity 
among these variables and GDPmean could threat the reliability of the exercise, by distorting 
the obtained coefficients and their significance levels. In this direction, anomalously high 
VIFs (which quantify the degree of variance distortion caused by collinearity to an estimated 
coefficient), greater than 1.9, accompanied by correlation values higher (or lower) than 0.5 (or 
-0.5) would trigger solid alarm signals. Additional concerns would arise whether an F-statistic 
(among those reported in Table 9), which strongly rejected the joint null hypothesis, was 
related to insignificant or scarcely significant coefficients, thus, unable to firmly discard the 
null hypothesis for the individual parameter. This investigation process led to a bunch of 
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explanatory variables whose connection with GDP per capita was more or less intuitive. For 
example, it is deeply recognized that OECD members (OECD) are on average wealthy 
countries and that income per capita works even as measure for a country’s institutional 
quality, mirroring the rationale behind the employment of Gov_Quality and the ordinal 
variable Qcluster. As it is well known that private credit to GDP ratio (BCreditGDP) strongly 
correlates with income level. A bit more blurred, instead, are the causes of the collinearity 
exhibited by KaoMean, the average of a financial openness index, and the banking 
concentration metric provided by Beck et al.(2000), Conc_Beck, although more concentrated 
banking sectors are generally associated with young growing financial systems. To 
definitively test whether a collinearity issue effectively exists I have regressed the duration 
dependent variable against the individual independent variables over which concerns of bias 
were strongest. Results from this analysis can be observed in Table 10.
As supposed, several of the variables expected to be affected by collinearity problems with 
GDPmean demonstrated a relevant and, in some cases, even strong direct correlation with the 
duration dependent variable. From this latest regressions, it emerges that the degree of a 
country’s capital account openness and its banking system concentration can both play a role 
in determining the inclination of a specific economy towards longer-lasting banking defaults. 
More in detail, countries characterized by milder restrictions on cross-border financial 
transactions could be more exposed to drastic capital flights or contagion from international 
shocks in case of systemic default, while a fragmented (distributed) banking industry is due to 
be much harder to recover than just concentrating the recovery effort on few institutions. The 
same weakness is expected to be shared by those countries whose economic, political and 
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institutional infrastructures are wealthier and robust. Nonetheless, it must be remembered that 
these considerations gain validity once a country is effectively plummeted into a crisis state. 
Therefore, if on average a wealthy and well-structured country demonstrated to be more 
exposed to lasting crisis events, the opposite relationship can become true once the variables 
in question are employed as early warning indicators in the attempt of forecasting those 
specific events. The results reached by Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1997) on GDP per 
capita and Law and Order index support this view. Differently, the positive sign exerted by 
BCreditGDP, the proxy measure for financial depth, is supported by previous findings, as a 
greater availability of instruments would allow to quickly relocate credit risk or eventually 
provide some shelter through sophisticated hedging strategies. Unfortunately, even when 
tested separately from income per capita, BCreditGDP coefficient could not prove statistically 
robust at a satisfying significance level. 
 
 
 60 
 
Chapter V: 
Robustness and Sensitivity Analysis 
5.1 Determinants check-up 
In the first part of the robustness analysis, I verify whether the results obtained on the 
determinants of a banking crisis are more or less solid. To do so, I keep the variables that 
showed a sound correlation with the oncoming of a crisis during the previous binomial 
exercises and I retest their performances under changed conditions, in terms of covered time-
span, independent and dependent variable. A plausible doubt can be raised on the possible 
misleading influence that integrated crisis dates on the original Rogoff and Reinhart (2009) 
definition could have brought in the regressions. Once these data have been discarded from 
the model, the count of countries under scrutiny squeezes and the resulting outcome is 
illustrated in Table 11 (1). No noteworthy changes in the significance level of the variables 
coefficients or in their signs materialize, confirming that the integration process has been 
managed with adequate care. Thereafter, I have questioned the specific dating procedure and 
crisis definition employed so far, reproducing the logistic analysis on a dependent variable 
built on the information provided in the systemic banking crisis database by Laeven and 
Valencia (2012). The verdict of this test, as displayed in Table 11 (7), confirmed the beliefs 
gathered around the predictive quality of some indicators as the growth rate of the Credit-to-
GDP ratio, the M2-to-Reserves and the Liquidity indexes while at the same time denying the 
centrality of the role played by the change in the exchange rate and the inflation rate. Along 
with the eclipsing of these variables, other indicators gained a stronger position in the 
analysis. GDP growth rate and Net Open Position are subjected to sharp movements toward 
satisfying significance levels. Both their negative signs have already been observed in the 
literature, telling of an increasing crisis likelihood in case of an economic downturn starting 
with a two-year lag and a one-year lagged negative net open position, highlighting a currency 
mismatch between banks’ assets and liabilities that, in turn, magnifies any balance sheet 
deterioration caused by an eventual drop in the domestic currency valuation. Again, all these 
findings gather wide support within the dedicated literature, confirming the choice of the 
banking crisis definition as one the most troublesome decision that a researcher and/or a 
policy maker have to take in implementing a EWS. Moving from the left to the right-hand 
side of the regression equation, four additional explanatory variables have been tested, all 
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being lagged by one period. Among these, the strongest signal is produced by the short-term 
lending real interest rate (Table 11/2) which confirms its relevance as early warning indicator 
and the detrimental effect of a lending interest rate shock on the solidity of banks’ balance 
sheets. Higher rates are deemed to increase the chance of banking crisis one year in advance, 
both because they reflect an ongoing financial liberalization and an increasing risk of greater 
shares of non-performing loans. Notably, the interest rate variable proved to be a good proxy 
for financial deregulation as it contemporaneously drown out the effect carried by the growth 
rate of private credit, as both variables pursues the same rationale. Other weaker but still 
significant correlations are showed by the capital account openness index (Kaopen; Table 
11/4) and the armed conflict dummy variable (Conflicts; Table 11/5). Respectively, these 
results suggest that countries with a tighter regulatory framework in matter of cross-border 
financial transactions and/or which are taking directly part into an armed conflict are more 
likely to experience a systemic banking crisis in the following year. In particular, a higher 
grade of financial openness is expected to make banks more resilient to surrounding shocks as 
they can lend abroad to partially hedge from domestic economy volatility. The export 
concentration index (HHI; Table 11/3) was deemed to capture to which extent an economy is 
focused on a restricted number of industries and, therefore, whether the banking sector degree 
of risk diversification could impact the probability of crisis. Although its sign is in line with 
the theoretical assumption that wants more concentrated economies highly exposed to full-
fledged financial meltdowns, its coefficient did not proved statistically able to reject the null 
hypothesis at a satisfying significance level. Ultimately, the dummy deposit insurance 
variable did not show a significant correlation with the likelihood of experiencing a crisis 
(Table 11/6). Overall, the variables that during the main logistic analysis proved able to 
solidly perform as banking crisis predictors confirmed the robustness of their valuable 
contribution in the attempt of building an effective EWS. 
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5.2 A different definition for banking crisis 
A part from the outcomes in matter of crisis determinants, one major element that could have 
been key in misleading my results consists in the choice of the crisis dating source used to 
build my dependent variable. Therefore, to further consolidate my findings over the post-
crisis bias and the role of the crisis duration in amplifying it, I have repeated the main 
exercises switching my initial dependent variable, built on the information provided by 
Rogoff and Reinhart (2010), with the one which relies on Laeven and Valencia (2012) dating 
procedure. Together with the work of Rogoff and Reinhart, the database built by Laeven and 
Valencia, whose latest version dates back to 2012, represents the state-of-the-art in terms of 
most updated financial crisis archives. Therein, a crisis episode is registered whether these 
two conditions coexist: significant signs of financial distress in the banking system (1) and 
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significant banking policy intervention measures in response to significant losses in the 
banking system (2). Signs of financial distress are defined as e.g. bank runs, losses in the 
banking system and/or bank liquidations, while a policy intervention is considered 
“significant” whether it met some quantitative prescriptions, for example the bank 
restructuring gross cost exceeds the 3 percent of GDP, or qualitative ones, such as system-
wide bank nationalizations, guarantees, deposit freezes and bank holidays. Built on these 
assumptions, the new data set allows the inclusion of countries that had to be previously 
discarded due to a lack of information under the crisis definition provided by Rogoff and 
Reinhart. Most of the recovered countries belong to the lower GDP per capita slots, thus 
contributing to an increasing diversification in the composition of the sample. The following 
economies, from almost all over the world, find a place in this analysis: Bangladesh, Belize, 
Chad, Republic of Congo, Dominica, Kuwait, Niger and Sierra Leone. With these premises 
and considering the extended version of the data sample (now including 78 countries), the 
resulting dependent variable counts in 80 systemic banking crises and 276 overall distressed 
annual observations. The adoption of this variable as regressand led to the results of the 
countercheck exercises on the logit models reported in Table 12. Here, I condensed the output 
information coming from the logistic regressions keeping what is effectively relevant in 
determining the power of the model as EWS and, if any, the existence of a post-crisis bias. 
The independent variables are the ones employed for the previous main logistic tests. As it 
can be clearly seen, the predictive quality improvement obtained by dropping the crisis years 
after the first is confirmed.  
Table 12. Logit models predictivity power once Laeven and Valencia (2012) dating system is employed. 
Laeven and Valencia(2012)  
Binomial 
Metrics* Treatment No Treatment 
Full Data Sample (1980-2013) 
Sensitivity (%) 55.4 56.8 
Specificity (%) 72.2 70.5 
Overall accuracy (%) 71.6 70.1 
AUC 0,7381 0.7176 
Small Data Sample (1998-2013) 
Sensitivity (%) 75.0 75.0 
Specificity (%) 80.3 78.8 
Overall accuracy (%) 80.2 78.7 
AUC 0.8548 0.8158 
*Specific cutoff probabilities computed as the ratio between the crisis periods and the total number of observation in each test 
(ranging from 1.7% to 3.2%). 
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Confirming the weight that the choice of the crisis dependent variable exerts on the 
performances of the individual warning indicators, Inflation and specially Depreciation lose 
their relevance while Net Open Position gains a stable and significant position in the model. 
Nonetheless, no coefficient turns its sign from positive to negative or vice versa.  
For what may concern the second step of the duration analysis, a similar pattern in the AUC-
Average Duration relationships can be appreciated in Graph 3 and Graph 4. The duration-
based threshold variable had to be adapted to the new dependent variable while the 
methodology did not change. Still the spread between the two lines, representing respectively 
the two diverse post-crisis years treatments, keeps on widening as much as the countries 
included in the sample have a greater average crisis length. This result further confirms the 
existence of a relationship between crisis duration and post-crisis bias and therefore the 
quality of the EWS. 
Graph 3.  Crisis average duration analysis. 
Graph 4. Incremental post-crisis bias. 
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Table 13 and Table 14 report the results of the linear regressions on the average crisis 
duration. The coefficients and all their t-statistics therein confirm the relationship between a 
country’s grade of wealth and the time length of the crises it is usually subjected to. Even the 
quality of institution confirms its relevance while the concentration of the banking system and 
the financial openness proxies lose their significance turning irrelevant. In their place, a proxy 
for financial liberalization stands out along with the export concentration index (HHI) and the 
count of currency crises (CurrencyC). These two latest findings, although empirically 
supported by some authors, completely lose their relevance once tested separately from 
income per capita while the negative correlation reported by frac_ent  endures, conveying a 
thicker evidence. This outcome gives some hint on the possible relationship between financial 
liberalization and crisis duration, suggesting that the more the financial system is restricted 
into a tight regulatory jacket the shorter it would be the recession in case of full-blown 
banking crisis.
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Besides changing the dependent variable, I have checked whether the same trend in the AUC-
based lines could be achieved by randomly adding additional countries to the sample. To 
verify this hypothesis, instead of the average duration threshold as sampling variable, I used 
the id number built on the country’s position in the alphabetical order. In order to recreate the 
same conditions as in the duration exercise, I have included all the zero-crisis countries (base 
group in the logit estimations) since the very first regression. Graph 5 shows that, running this 
exercise, the same ever widening spread between the lines cannot be observed anymore. This 
result strengthens the belief that simply adding crisis episodes to the sample is not a sufficient 
condition to improve the efficacy of the proposed post-crisis bias solution. Noteworthy, the 
model adopting the bias solution always outperforms the other. 
Graph 5. A random sample test to confirm crisis duration influence on the model predictive power. 
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5.3 Multinomial logit model 
In order to switch from a binomial to a multiclass framework, the discrete dependent variable 
had to adapt, from being a dummy to a categorical one. Once the change has taken place, it 
allows for three possible outcome states: tranquil (no crisis) periods 𝑌𝑖 ,𝑡 = 0 (where i stands 
for the country and t for the period of observation), first year of crisis,𝑌𝑖 ,𝑡 = 1, and following 
years of crisis after the first,𝑌𝑖 ,𝑡 = 2. As anticipated, this distinction should permit me to avoid 
the distortion produced by those annual observations that, even though treated as tranquil 
times, are undoubtedly influenced by the economic distress triggered by the burst of the crisis. 
This phenomenon, so far called post-crisis bias or crisis duration bias and expected to stand 
out particularly accentuated for systemic banking crises, due to their long-lasting duration and 
effect on a country’s economic environment, has already boldly emerged during the previous 
binomial exercises. The benefits generated by the multinomial model should not be limited to 
an improvement in the model predict power. In fact, by recycling the information carried by 
the post-crisis observation, the model should provide access to a deeper understanding of the 
variables partial effects on the crisis probability. To our knowledge, this represents the very 
first attempt in banking crisis literature of employing a multinomial logit model on a 
heterogeneous and extended country data set for EWS, with post-crisis bias related purposes. 
Hardy and Pazarbaṣioĝlu (1999), although similarly employing a mixed data set, exploited the 
incremented flexibility carried by the categorical dependent variable to distinguish between 
pre-crisis and crisis years and between severe and full-blown episodes. Other previous works, 
as the ones already mentioned, have focused on clusters exclusively composed by open 
market economies (Bussiere and Fratzscher, 2006) or region-oriented (Caggiano et al., 2014). 
The multinomial tests fit the same specifics of the first binomial regressions. The crisis dating 
procedure employed is the one provided by Rogoff and Reinhart (2009), already examined in 
depth in the previous chapters, and the variables included as early earning indicators are the 
ones listed in Table 1a. Table 15 reports the results of the multinomial tests on the full data 
sample. The first panel displays the resulting coefficients from comparing the probability of 
entering in a crisis (𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 1) against the one of experiencing tranquil times (𝑌𝑖 ,𝑡 = 0), our base 
outcome. The coefficients of the variables and their t-statistics, apart from the case of Credit-
to-GDP, almost fully match with the outcome produced by the binomial model. No relevant 
differences are highlighted as variables significance levels, as well as the extent of their 
correlations, coincide with the results previously described. This outcome overlapping was 
fairly expected as both dependent and independent variables employed to test the probability 
of an oncoming crisis did not change along with the model definition. Furthermore, the 
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similarity among the parameters offers a preliminary check for the existence of the 
Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) assumption. Also known as binary 
independence, this assumption holds just in case the odds of experiencing the crisis event with 
respect of being in tranquil times does not depend on whether some other alternative is 
present or absent. This condition is essential for the multinomial model in order to be 
unbiased and valid. With this matter, the necessary evidences to verify whether this 
assumption statistically holds are provided by the Hausman-McFadden test (1984) and the 
SUE-based (Seemingly Unrelated Estimation) Hausman test. Based on the results obtained by 
running these analysis on my multinomial model (which can be observed in Appendix 3), I 
can conclude that the null hypothesis of independent alternatives cannot be rejected and, 
therefore, confirm that the IIA hypothesis holds. For what may concern the novelties brought 
in by the multinomial model, the results for the post-crisis period (𝑌𝑖,𝑡 = 2) are disclosed in 
the second panel of Table 15. Here, the variables contribution on the probability of remaining 
in a crisis state with respect of going back to a more tranquil period are reported. The peculiar 
behavior of some variables during post-crisis years (see averages in Table 1b) works again in 
favor of the post-crisis bias hypothesis, suggesting that these observations cannot be correctly 
compared to tranquil periods. Looking more specifically at the results, a prolonged economic 
recession is expected to further worsen the banking sector stability or at least to contrast its 
recovery. Indeed, GDP growth is strongly statistically significant in all the specifications of 
the model. Inflation, while turning its sign from positive to negative, loses most, if not all, its 
statistical consistency, signaling that once the crisis has already climbed or it is starting to 
manifest (being the variable one year lagged) the macroeconomic environment does not hold 
the main role it had as warning indicator in molding the future probability of the country to 
keep on experiencing the crisis or leave this state. As the case of the economic recession, the 
same deteriorating effect should be provoked by a growing ratio between banks’ credits and 
banks’ deposits which works as a proxy for the banking sector liquidity position. The 
displayed results confirm this belief with a Liquidity ratio significant and positively correlated 
with the likelihood of enduring in the crisis state. Even the M2-to-Reserves and the Credit-to-
GDP ratios maintain the same signs as in the first panel but the p-value of the second one 
soars well above the 10% significance threshold, turning Credit-to-GDP statistically 
irrelevant. On the other hand, vulnerability from sudden capital outflow preserves its 
incisiveness on the probability of remaining under stress. Depreciation shift towards a 
positive correlation is supported by theory too. As the national current account benefits from 
the pre-crisis domestic currency depreciation, a turnaround in this matter would mean a drop 
in exports and a consequently worse balance of payment outfit. In this matter, the impact 
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exerted by the change in rate of exchange vanishes once the change in the terms of trade is 
taken into consideration. Terms of Trade variable resulted highly statistically relevant in the 
fifth and more exhaustive specification (Table 15/5), apparently absorbing the effect of an 
exchange rate movement. In this context, an upward movement of the ratio between exports 
and imports appear to be detrimental to the state of the economy increasing the likelihood of a 
prolonged banking depression. The Net Open Position variable preserves its negative 
coefficient suggesting that even after the burst of the crisis, a higher favorable foreign 
currency mismatch between banking sector assets and liabilities can contribute to a faster 
recovery, as the threat of domestic currency devaluation comes weaker. However, its t-
statistic is still too low to be able to discard the null hypothesis with a satisfying degree of 
certainty.  
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Ultimately, in order to complete the benchmark framework between the two logistic models I 
have replicated the post-estimation analysis to compute the predictive quality expressed by 
the model. In doing so I could not rely on the same techniques adopted to elaborate the ROC 
curves and the related AUC areas for the binomial model. I have therefore implemented a 
tailored algorithm for multiclass ROC curves able to isolate and test separately each pair of 
outcomes among the three accounted by my crisis dependent variable. While the AUC was 
computed over the full range of possible cutoff probabilities, to determine the other post-
estimation metrics, as Specificity and Sensitivity, I have adopted the same threshold 
previously used with the binomial model which accounted for the post-crisis bias (3.4%). 
Under these assumptions the multinomial model slightly outperforms its symmetric binomial 
version, as well as outperforming the binomial specification that does not account for any 
treatment in matter of crisis duration bias. Numerically speaking, the multinomial model had 
successfully predicted 44.9 % of the crisis episodes (Sensitivity), issuing false alarms (Type II 
error) just in the 17.1% of the cases (Specificity was 82.9%) and 81.9% overall observations 
correctly classified. The generated AUC, plotted in Panel 3 along with the ROC, resulted 
barely greater than that of the “treated” binomial (0.7222). Difference, however, that can be 
noticed just at the third decimal place of the value. 
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Chapter VI: 
Conclusions 
The latest full-blown “subprime” crisis, whose inception officially dates back to the end of 
2007, reminded the international community, especially industrialized and highly financially-
developed countries, how severely such kind of shocks can strike and how painful the 
recovery path to leave them behind could be. Though mutating their characteristic aspects 
through time, these events demonstrated to preserve some common features that can hopefully 
lead towards the implementation of tools able to predict and eventually prevent them from 
happening. Early Warning System models endorse these goals and, as the forecasting quality 
and precision offered by these instruments climb up, fostered by the interest gathering over 
the topic and the effort of the scientific research, policy makers are more than ever 
considering to effectively employ these frameworks during their financial decision process. In 
light of the pressing need to further refine these instruments, this paper firstly analyses the 
performances of some widely-recognized variables as early warning indicators for banking 
crises and the capacity of the binomial and multinomial logistic models to fulfill the EWS 
duties. From the regressions run on an extensive and heterogeneous panel data sample, 
including a wide range of crisis episodes and countries, it emerges a scenario that has been 
largely sustained by the theory in the field. An increasingly unstable macroeconomic 
environment, detected by a rising inflation, fosters the chance of a banking system to fall into 
a recession. The role of a lagged credit boom in setting the stage for a credit crunch and the 
consecutive deterioration of banks’ balance sheets have been confirmed by most of the tests, 
especially those exclusively accounting for the Great Recession periods (limiting the sample 
from 1998 to 2013) which have been notoriously characterized by the burst of huge credit and 
real estate bubbles. An expansive credit market is due to be backed by a financial deregulation 
being in place, with falling lending standards. With this regard, increasing real interest rate 
one year prior to the burst of the crisis found robust empirical support and with it the belief 
that wants a systemic default preceded by an ongoing  financial liberalization. Along with the 
downsizing of the sample, as it is the case for the application of the real lending interest rate 
(1994-2013) and the leverage ratio (1998-2013), the significance of a change in the exchange 
rate is drained away to firmly reappear with a negative coefficient when the regressions are 
run again on the extended panel (1980-2013). This behavioral swing proves either the deep 
differences in the causal force behind each specific crisis episode and, most often than not, the 
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weakening effect of a drop in the rate of a country domestic currency exchange rate on the 
stability of the respective banking system. This is particularly due to the more or less wide 
exposure of the banks towards foreign exchange risks which are fed, for example, by 
borrowing abroad and simultaneously lending in domestic currency.  The tested models 
unanimously agree on the positive relationship between the lagged values of the M2 to 
Reserves and the Liquidity ratio with the likelihood of experiencing a crisis. Respectively, the 
first ratio, by measuring the capacity of an economy to react to sudden capital outflows or a 
strong devaluation of the currency, indicates that, as its value increases, the exposure of the 
banking system and the overall economy to unexpected liquidity shocks sky-rockets. Either 
because depleted foreign exchange reserves limit government and central bank freedom of 
action in case of a rampant currency devaluation or because expanding monetary policy could 
foment inflation as well as currency devaluation too. Liquidity ratio, instead, is much related 
to the state of health of the banking system consolidated balance sheet and the capacity of 
these financial institutions to deal with tough, perhaps unexpected, credit deterioration. 
Unsurprisingly, the vulnerability of the banking system follows the trend of this ratio. When 
illiquidity expands, the system is more exposed to uncovered losses and vice versa. For what 
may concern the impact of the economic boom, the double lag imposed on the GDP growth 
variable seems fairly excessive, at least when adopting the crisis definition proposed by 
Rogoff and Reinhart (2009). In fact, its coefficient struggle to show significant early warning 
signs until the variable is tested contemporaneous to the crisis period (less than one year prior 
to the burst). Under these conditions, the variable confirms the strong negative impact that an 
economic recession could have on the banking system, as loan deterioration sky-rockets, but 
its merit as early warning indicator gets weaker. Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996), who have 
examined monthly data around the crisis, found that the GDP growth starts declining almost 8 
months prior to the onset of the crisis, giving credit to these allegations. Nonetheless, the 
robust tests built on an alternative crisis dating procedure (Laeven and Valencia, 2012) and 
the outcome produced by the regional exercise of Caggiano et al. (2014) suggest that the 
timing  with which an economic recession shows up before a banking crisis varies across 
different sample specifications and crisis definitions. An in depth examination of this specific 
interpretation is undoubtedly required, especially considering the rich literature sustaining the 
leading role of this variable. 
A part from building a deeper understanding of which the determinants of a banking crisis 
could be, the paper focused on how to improve the performance of the logit model as Early 
Warning System for these events. In particular, it had the scope of shedding a brighter light on 
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the so called post-crisis or crisis duration bias whose detrimental effect on the model 
predictivity,  until now, has just been marginally investigated. With this regard, the results 
from the binomial comparison framework strongly confirmed the importance of the adoption 
of a post-crisis bias solution to boost the forecasting efficacy of the model. The presence of 
the bias and the validity of the proposed solution have been confirmed across several 
framework specifications (both binomial and multinomial) which differed in terms of country 
sample, dependent and explanatory variables. During the second empirical phase, I have 
elaborated an exercise that could return some hints on the relationship between the post-crisis 
bias and the duration of crisis event. To the best of my knowledge, this represented the first 
attempt to track down the features of the relationship between a logit EWS predictive quality 
and the duration of the crisis episodes. Keeping the AUC of each tested model as supreme 
measure for its forecasting power and by partitioning the full data sample in clusters on the 
basis of an average crisis duration variable, I have found that: the longer the crises under 
scrutiny last, the more the post-crisis bias negatively influences the model quality and, 
therefore, the more advisable the adoption of a dedicated solution should be. 
In order to make this suggestion more viable to policy makers inclined to exploit it, I have 
regressed the average duration per country on a long series of institutional, economic and 
political indicators, crossing the boundary that divides two main research areas that float 
around systemic banking crises: one dedicated to the study of the determinants of a crisis and 
their implementations as early warning indicators, the other one involved in unveiling which 
forces can influence the severity of a default. Severity that in few cases is proxied by crisis 
duration variables, similarly, to some extent, to the exercise reported in this paper. The results 
describe a strong positive relationship between income per capita (GDP per capita) and the 
average crisis duration. Once a crisis occurs, economies characterized by above-average 
wealth per capita, healthy institutions, distributed financial sectors and elevate financial 
openness (low restrictions on cross-border financial transactions) are more prone to persist 
longer periods in crisis state. In view of these considerations, countries that fit with the 
characteristics just described, more than other, should strongly consider to adopt a post-crisis 
bias solution when implementing a logit EWS for systemic banking crisis. This decision 
would be crucial to tailor the model to their specific economy and sharpen the most its 
predictive accuracy. 
However, these latest conclusions should be treated with caution and should be matter of 
further analysis to meet desirable reliability standards. The linear regression exercise, in 
particular, is new in its execution. Never before a crisis-duration variable has been regressed 
against such a number of static metrics which, until now, have proved their validity just 
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during panel data based exercises. Most of these indicators proved validly correlated with 
crisis duration when tested around the crisis date along with their annual or monthly timing, 
while largely losing their relevance once averaged over the period. 
To a smaller extent, other aspects of my work inevitably present some limitations. The 
subjective choice of the dependent variable is certainly one. I have tried to cope with this 
drawback by verifying my findings on two different banking crisis definitions (Rogoff and 
Reinhart, 2009; Laeven and Valencia, 2012). Despite the main results targeted by the paper 
are proven satisfactorily robust, the choice of banking crisis definition still detains a 
potentially deep impact on the output of the tests and, therefore, on the indications provided 
by the EWS. Future research shall firmly tackle this issue in order to clear the path towards a 
widely agreed and effective early warning framework. For what may regard the relationship 
between the quality of the EWS and the duration of the crises, similar tests on a larger sample, 
either in terms of number of countries and time-span, are required to further strengthen the 
statements achieved in this paper, allocating them the authority that the mild experience of the 
author in the field does not permit him to do.  
Nonetheless, the author believes that his work has the merit to highlight a new path towards a 
higher understanding of these systemic phenomena, drawing the first empirical conclusions 
on the duration-EWS relationship and, thus, laying the foundations for its future thorough 
comprehension. The quest for the implementation of an exhaustive early warning framework 
is still widely open and the path towards its accomplishment is full of complexities that wait 
to be properly handled. In any case, the ultimate prize will definitely worth the effort. 
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Appendix 
 
 
Appendix 1. Sample composition and crisis periods included in each data set. Countries are grouped on the 
basis of their GNI per capita as proposed by the World Bank  (2014). Income Groups: Low Income (lightest blue; 
$1,045 or less), Low Middle Income (from $1,046 to $4,124), Upper Middle Income (from $4,126 to $12,175), 
High Income (darkest blue; $12,175 or more). 
Country Rogoff & Reinhart (2009) Laeven & Valencia (2012) RS 
Benin 1988-1990 1988-1992   
Burkina Faso 1988-1994 1990-1994   
Burundi 1994-1995 1994-1998   
Central African Rep. (1976)-1982, 1988-1999 1995-1996   
Chad*   1992-1996   
Gambia       
Mali 1987-1989 1987-1991   
Nepal 1988 1988   
Niger*   1983-1985   
Sierra Leone*   1990-1994 X 
Togo 1993-1995 1993-1994   
Bangladesh*   1987 X 
Bolivia 1986-1987, 1994-1996, 1999 1986, 1994 X 
Cameroon 1987-1993, 1995-1998 1987-1991, 1995-1997   
Congo (Rep.)*   1992-1994   
Côte d'Ivoire 1988-1991 1988-1992   
Egypt 1981-1983, 1990-1995 1980 X 
El Salvador 1989-1990 1989-1990 X 
Ghana 1982-1989, 1997 1982-1983 X 
Guatemala       
Guyana   1993   
Honduras     X 
India   1993 X 
Indonesia  1997-2002 1997-2001 X 
Kenya 1985-1988, 1992-1995 1985, 1992-1994 X 
Lesotho       
Morocco 1983-1984 1980-1984 X 
Nicaragua 1987-1996 1990-1993, 2000-2001   
Nigeria 1992-1995, 1997, 2009-2013 1991-1995, 2009-2012 X 
Papua New Guinea       
Philippines 1981-1987, 1997-2001 1983-1986, 1997-2001 X 
Senegal 1988-1991 1988-1991 X 
Sri Lanka 1989-1993 1989-1991   
Swaziland 1995 1995-1999   
Zambia 1995-1998 1995-1998   
Algeria 1990-1992 1990-1994   
Belize*       
Botswana       
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Brazil 1985-1986, 1990-1991, 1994-1997 1990-1998 X 
China 1997-1999 1998 X 
Colombia 1982-1987, 1998-2000 1982, 1998-2000 X 
Costa Rica 1987-1991, 1994-1996 1987-1991, 1994-1995 X 
Dominica*       
Dominican Republic 2003-2004 2003-2004 X 
Ecuador 1981, 1996-2002 1982-1986, 1998-2002 X 
Gabon       
Jamaica 1995-2000 1996-1998   
Jordan   1989-1991 X 
Malaysia 1985-1988, 1997-2001 1997-1999 X 
Mauritius       
Mexico 1981-1982, 1993-1997 1981-1985, 1994-1996 X 
Panama 1988-1989 1988-1989 X 
Peru 1983-1990, 1999 1983 X 
South Africa 1989   X 
Thailand 1983-1987, 1996-2000 1983, 1997-2000 X 
Tunisia 1991-1995 1991   
Turkey 1982-1985, 2000-2001 1982-1984, 2000-2001 X 
Argentina 
1980-1982, 1989-1990, 1995-1996, 
2001-2003 
1980-1982, 1989-1991, 1995, 2001-
2003 X 
Australia     X 
Canada     X 
Chile 1981-1984 1981-1985 X 
Denmark 2008-2013 2008-2012 X 
Finland 1991-1994 1991-1995 X 
Iceland 2007-2013 2008-2012 X 
Ireland 2007-2012 2008-2012 X 
Israel (1977)-1983   X 
Italy 2008-2013 2008-2012 X 
Japan 1992-2001 1997-2001 X 
Korea, Republic  1985-1988, 1997-2000 1997-1998 X 
Kuwait*   1982-1985 X 
Netherlands 2008-2013 2008-2012 X 
New Zealand 1987-1990     
Singapore     X 
Switzerland 2008-2009 2008-2012 X 
United Kingdom 2007-2013 2007-2012 X 
United States 2007-2010 1988, 2007-2012 X 
Uruguay 1981-1985, 2002-2005 1981-1985, 2002-2005   
Venezuela, RB 1993-1996, 2009-2010 1994-1998 X 
*Countries excluded from the main dependent variable (Rogoff and Reinhart). RS: Reduced Sample. 
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Appendix 2. World-wide perspective of the countries involved in the exercises clustered by GDP per capita (in 
current US $). Dotted ones take part just to the tests employing Laeven and Valencia (2012) dating procedure. 
Appendix 3. IIA hypothesis tests for multinomial logit. Hausman test (a) and SUE-based test (b). 
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Appendix 4. Data sources. 
Variable Description Source 
Logistic Regression Analysis 
SBCRR 
(dependent) 
Discrete dependent variable which takes on value of 1 
during banking crisis episodes and 0 otherwise. When the 
model is multinomial the crisis years other than the first 
are set at 2. 
Rogoff and Reinhart 
(2010) 
SBCLV 
(dependent) 
Laeven and Valencia 
(2012) 
GDP growth 
Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices 
based on constant local currency. 
World Bank WDI 
Inflation 
Inflation as measured by the annual growth rate of the 
GDP implicit deflator. 
World Bank WDI 
Depreciation 
Annual change in the official exchange rate determined 
by national authorities or to the rate determined in the 
legally sanctioned exchange market. 
World Bank WDI 
M2-to-Reserves 
Ratio of money and quasi money M2 to total reserves 
under the control of monetary authorities. 
World Bank WDI 
Credit-to-GDP growth 
Annual growth of the domestic credit provided by 
financial sector as a percentage of GDP. 
World Bank WDI 
Liquidity 
Financial resources provided to the private sector by 
domestic money banks as a share of total deposits. 
World Bank Global 
Financial Development 
Database 
Net Open Position Ratio of net foreign assets to GDP. World Bank WDI 
Terms of Trade change 
Annual growth rate of the ratio between exports and 
Imports. 
World Bank WDI 
Leverage Ratio of bank capital and reserves to total assets. 
World Bank Global 
Financial Development 
Database 
Real Interest Rate 
Lending interest rate adjusted for inflation as measured 
by the GDP deflator. 
World Bank WDI; 
Oxford Economics 
(Datastream) 
Export Concentration 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index of concentration of 
merchandise import and export on a country base (it 
ranges from 0 to 1). 
UNCTAD (2015) 
Kaopen 
Known as the Chinn-Ito index is an indicator of a 
country’s degree of capital account openness. 
Chinn, Menzie D. and 
Hiro Ito (2006) 
Conflicts 
Dummy variable that takes value 1 in case of direct 
involvement in an armed conflict (a minimum of 25 
battle-related deaths per year) and 0 otherwise. 
UCDP/PRIO Armed 
Conflict Dataset (2015) 
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Explicit 
Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 to highlight the 
presence of an explicit deposit insurance scheme. 
Deposit Insurance 
Database (2013) 
Linear Regression Analysis 
GDPmean GDP per capita in US $ (current value) World Bank WDI 
Latitude Ranges from 0 to 1 (south to north) 
Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, 
Levine (2000) 
OECD Binary OECD 
Conc_Beck Fraction of assets held by the three largest banks. 
Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, 
Levine (2000)  
Conc_Caprio Share of deposits held by the five largest banks. 
Barth, Caprio, and 
Levine (2001) - Survey 
of Bank Regulation and 
Supervision 
Conc_3 Fraction of assets held by the three largest banks. BankScope 
Conc_5 Fraction of assets held by the three largest banks. BankScope 
RCC 
Total credit booms years per country based on the 
variation of real credit per capita from its long term trend. 
Marco Arena, Serpil 
Bouza, Era Dabla-Norris, 
Kerstin Gerling, and 
Lamin Njie (2015) 
Qcluster 
Weighted means of economic, political and legal 
institutional quality indexes (1-5) 
Kunčič, A. (2014). 
Institutional Quality 
Dataset, Journal of 
Institutional Economics 
Gov_Quality 
Voice and accountability, political stability, government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and 
corruption. From 0 to 1, from worse to better governance. 
Kaufman, Kraay and 
Zoido-Lobaton (1999) 
frac_ent 
Number of entry applications denied as a fraction of the 
total number of applications received from domestic and 
foreign entities. 
Barth, Caprio, and 
Levine (2001) - Survey 
of Bank Regulation and 
Supervision 
restrict 
Sum of four measures that indicate the degree of 
restriction of bank activities in the securities, insurance 
and real estate markets and ownership and control of 
nonfinancial firms. From 1 (unrestricted) to 4 
(prohibited). 
Barth, Caprio, and 
Levine (2001) - Survey 
of Bank Regulation and 
Supervision 
rr Ratio of reserves required to be held by banks. 
Barth, Caprio, and 
Levine (2001) - Survey 
of Bank Regulation and 
Supervision 
bfree 
Indicator of relative openness of banking and financial 
system. 
Index of Economic 
Freedom (Heritage 
Foundation) 
KAOPEN 
Known as the Chinn-Ito index is an indicator of a 
country’s degree of capital account openness. 
Chinn, Menzie D. and 
Hiro Ito (2006) 
BCreditGDP 
Ratio of domestic credit to private sector provided by 
banks as a percentage of GDP. 
World Bank WDI 
HHI 
The Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index (Product HHI), is a 
measure of the degree of product concentration on a 
country basis. 
UNCTAD Statistics 
CurrencyCount 
Total years of currency crisis experienced by a country 
during the period 1980-2010. 
Rogoff and Reinhart 
(2010) 
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SovereignCount 
Total years of sovereign debt crisis experienced by a 
country during the period 1980-2010. 
Rogoff and Reinhart 
(2010) 
ConflictCount Total years of armed conflict experienced by the country. 
UNCDP/PRIO Armed 
Conflict Dataset 
Foreign 
Percentage of banking system assets in banks that are 50 
% or more foreign owned. 
Barth, Caprio, and 
Levine (2001) - Survey 
of Bank Regulation and 
Supervision 
State 
Percentage of banking system assets in banks that are 50 
% or more state owned. 
Barth, Caprio, and 
Levine (2001) - Survey 
of Bank Regulation and 
Supervision 
Muslim 
Variables that capture the percentage of population that is 
Muslim. 
Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, 
Levine (2000) 
Catholic 
Variables that capture the percentage of population that is 
Catholic. 
Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, 
Levine (2000)  
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